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ARTICLE 
LEGISLATING IN THE SHADOWS 
CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER† 
Federal agencies are deeply involved in both the foreground and shadows of 
legislative drafting. In the foreground, agencies draft the substantive legislation the 
Administration desires to submit to Congress. In the shadows, agencies provide 
confidential “technical drafting assistance” on legislation that originates with 
congressional staffers. This technical drafting assistance provides Congress with 
agency expertise on the subject matter, which helps Congress avoid considering 
legislation that would unnecessarily disrupt the current statutory scheme. It also 
allows the agency to play an active—yet opaque—role in drafting legislation from 
the very early stages. In fact, the empirical findings presented in this Article, based 
on extensive interviews and surveys at some twenty federal agencies, suggest that 
agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of proposed 
legislation that directly affects them and on most legislation that gets enacted. 
The underexplored yet widespread practice of legislating in the shadows has 
important implications for administrative law theory and doctrine, as well as the 
conventional principal–agent bureaucratic model. On one hand, this phenomenon 
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perhaps supports the growing scholarly call that agencies should be allowed to engage 
in more purposivist interpretation (than their judicial counterparts) because of their 
expertise in legislative history and purpose as well as their role in statutory drafting. 
On the other, this phenomenon may cast some doubt on the foundations for judicial 
deference to agency statutory interpretations. Agencies are usually intimately involved 
in drafting legislation that ultimately delegates—to themselves—the authority to interpret 
that very legislation. In other words, many of the criticisms of agency self-delegation 
raised against Auer deference could apply with some force to Chevron deference as 
well. At the very least, scholars should consider more closely the administrative state’s 
role in drafting legislation—especially drafting legislation in the shadows—when 
evaluating the level of deference courts should give to agency statutory interpretations. 
Such reconsideration is particularly warranted given the lack of transparency implicated 
by legislating in the shadows. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies help draft statutes. They are involved in the foreground 
of the legislative process when, in coordination with the White House, they 
propose substantive legislation to Congress that advances agency and 
Administration objectives, and when they weigh in substantively with agency 
and Administration policy positions on pending legislation. Federal agencies 
also help draft statutes in the background by providing “technical drafting 
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assistance” on legislation that originates from congressional staffers. Such 
drafting assistance is often provided confidentially—without White House 
oversight, much less public notice and comment—and continues to be 
provided throughout the legislative process. By sharing their subject matter 
expertise, the agency conducts technical drafting assistance that helps Congress 
avoid pursuing legislation that would unnecessarily disrupt the current 
statutory and regulatory scheme. But it also allows the agency to play an active, 
nonpublic role in drafting legislation from the very early stages. 
In fact, the empirical findings presented in this Article, based on extensive 
interviews and surveys at some twenty federal agencies, suggest that agencies 
provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of the proposed 
legislation that directly affects them and on most legislation that gets 
enacted.1 It turns out that the vast majority of legislative drafting conducted 
by federal agencies today is not agency-initiated substantive legislation, 
but “legislating in the shadows” through confidential agency responses to 
congressional requests for technical drafting assistance. 
This underexplored but widespread practice of legislating in the shadows 
is yet another departure from the “lost world of administrative law,” further 
revealing “an increasing mismatch between the suppositions of modern 
administrative law and the realities of modern regulation.”2 This phenomenon 
also complicates the bureaucratic principal–agent model that positive political 
theorists have developed over decades,3 especially in the context of agency 
statutory interpretation and judicial review thereof.4 
 
1 Many findings discussed in this Article were first reported by the author in an independent 
report commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). See generally 
Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: Technical Assistance in Statutory 
Drafting, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826146 [https://perma.cc/V3B6-
88J4] [hereinafter Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process]. See also Adoption of 
Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161 (Dec. 16, 2015) (summarizing ACUS’s findings and 
recommending that federal agencies should “endeavor to provide Congress with technical drafting 
assistance when asked”). 
2 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014). 
3 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 765-72 
(1984) (applying principal–agent theory to the administrative state and detailing asymmetries and 
other complications); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) (“The basic 
principal-agent dilemma, of which legislative delegation is a subspecies, involves a tradeoff between 
the principal’s desire to exploit the agent’s informational advantages and the principal’s concern that 
the agent will pursue divergent goals.”). See generally Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of 
Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005) (reviewing political science literature on 
the evolution of the principal–agency theory regarding the administrative state). 
4 For a literature review of the application of positive political theory to agency statutory 
interpretation, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
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After Part I of the Article presents the findings from the study based on 
interviews and surveys of agency officials, Part II focuses on two implications 
of legislating in the shadows for administrative law theory and doctrine. 
First, this phenomenon generally lends support to the growing scholarly 
call that agencies should be allowed to engage in more purposivist interpretation 
(than their judicial counterparts) because of their expertise in legislative 
history and their substantial role in statutory drafting.5 In other words, 
agencies’ extensive involvement in the legislative process—often from the 
very outset and then through enactment—better equips those same agencies 
to understand the purpose of the legislation than the more generalist federal 
courts. Thus, agencies should have more flexibility to take into account such 
statutory purpose. 
Second, and conversely, legislating in the shadows may cast further doubt 
on the foundations for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. 
As the findings in this Article underscore, agencies are intimately involved in 
drafting legislation that ultimately delegates the authority to interpret that 
legislation to the same agencies. It might therefore be more appropriate to 
set the interpretive presumption against Chevron deference6 and, instead, 
accord only Skidmore weight based on the agency’s “power to persuade.”7 After 
all, many of the agency self-delegation criticisms raised against Auer deference8 
could apply with some force to agency statutory interpretation and Chevron 
deference as well. Concerns of “administrative collusion” are amplified when 
one considers the agency’s substantial role in providing confidential technical 
 
O’Connell eds., 2010). To be sure, the bureaucratic principal–agent model was already complex. For 
instance, federal agencies have at least two principals, namely Congress and the President. See, e.g., 
Miller, supra note 3, at 211-12 (discussing Congress and the President as “jealous” principals in the 
context of the principal–agent model); Moe, supra note 3, at 768-69 (noting that agencies have 
multiple principals because they are overseen by both the President and congressional committees). 
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that even this dual-principal model is overly simplistic. See, 
e.g., Brigham Daniels, Agency As Principal, 48 GA. L. REV. 335, 341 (2014) (noting that the relationship 
between “administrative agencies and the elected branches . . . is a good deal more complicated than the 
conventional understanding assumes”); Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes 
the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1491-1501 (2015) (arguing that the dominant notion of 
Congress delegating power to the executive is complicated by the concept of the “collective Congress”). 
5 See infra Section II.A (reviewing the relevant literature). 
6 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (instructing 
courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers). 
7 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
8 See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(criticizing Auer deference because “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages 
the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases”); 
see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (asserting that an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’”). 
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drafting assistance.9 This additional concern over agency self-dealing may be 
the last straw for Chevron’s demise in light of the constitutional, normative, 
and administrability concerns already being discussed in the literature, on 
Capitol Hill, and at the Supreme Court.10 At the very least, this phenomenon 
could lend further support for Chief Justice Roberts’s narrower, context-specific 
approach to Chevron deference as articulated in his dissent in City of Arlington 
v. FCC11 and his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.12 
In light of the current practice of legislating in the shadows, open-government 
concerns might heighten the need to revisit judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretation. After all, transparency is a core value in administrative law. 
Yet, as documented in Part I, the provision of agency technical drafting assistance 
generally takes place in secret, often before the bill is even introduced, and 
with an expectation that the congressional request and agency response will 
remain confidential. Indeed, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
does not require preclearance of technical drafting assistance, and OMB is 
seldom kept in the loop (though the political appointees in the agency’s 
legislative affairs office are almost always involved in the process). To advance 
administrative law’s critical values of public transparency and open governance, 
one could argue that the technical drafting assistance process should take place 
in the sunshine—just like most other agency actions. As discussed in Part III, 
however, the costs of such transparency are arguably too great. Such 
transparency would likely discourage Congress from even consulting with 
agency experts at an early stage in the legislative process, when the legislation 
is more easily reworked and thus where input from agency subject matter 
experts is most valuable. 
Instead, this Article concludes that the better solution to address these 
transparency concerns may be to rework the level of deference under which 
courts review agency statutory interpretations. Put differently, since agencies 
help legislate in the shadows, perhaps the grand compromise needed to 
recalibrate the modern administrative state is for courts to allow agencies to 
continue to provide technical drafting assistance to Congress and engage in 
 
9 See Rao, supra note 4, at 1504 (“By fracturing the collective Congress and empowering 
individual members, delegation also promotes collusion between members of Congress and 
administrative agencies.”). 
10 See infra Section II.B (reviewing relevant literature on criticisms of the Chevron doctrine). 
11 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880-81 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that when determining “whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority 
over the statutory ambiguity at issue,” the Court should “ask[] whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] 
authority to the agency to elucidate [the] specific provision of the statute by regulation’”). 
12 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“Whether those credits are available on 
Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic and political significance that is central to 
this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would 
have done so expressly.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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more purposivist statutory interpretation, yet to review such interpretations 
without the highly deferential Chevron standard. Or, at least, for courts to 
only apply Chevron deference—as the Chief Justice would prefer—when the 
reviewing court is satisfied that Congress as a whole intended to delegate to 
the agency interpretive authority regarding the particular statutory provision. 
Such technical drafting assistance would continue to take place in the shadows 
to encourage congressional drafters to leverage agency expertise, but agencies 
would have fewer incentives for self-dealing in the absence of highly deferential 
judicial review of subsequent agency statutory interpretations. 
I. STUDY OF AGENCY TECHNICAL DRAFTING ASSISTANCE 
A. Background and Relevant Literature 
Despite the administrative state’s substantial role in the legislative process, 
we know very little about how agencies actually interact with Congress in the 
legislative process. We have barely begun to incorporate empirical realities into 
our theories of agency statutory interpretation and administrative governance.13 
To be sure, many have recognized over the years that the administrative state 
plays an expansive role in drafting legislation.14 For instance, Justice Felix 
 
13 Studies by Jarrod Shobe and Ganesh Sitaraman are two notable and recent exceptions. In 2014, 
Shobe conducted a fifty-five-question survey of fifty-four agency staffers involved in legislative matters 
at fourteen executive departments and eleven independent agencies. Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As 
Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
451, 460-67 (2017). The Shobe study explored the role of federal agencies in the legislative process, 
including some exploration of their role in providing technical drafting assistance. Id. at 467-82. 
Similarly, the Sitaraman article details the legislative process generally—including some discussion 
of the role of federal agencies in providing substantive and technical drafting assistance. Ganesh Sitaraman, 
The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 124-43 (2015). His article is “derived in part 
from [his] experiences serving as senior counsel to Senator Elizabeth Warren.” Id. at 79 n.*. 
14 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE 
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221 (2012) (noting that 
“Congress often depended upon the departments to draft major legislation” in the 1800s, and even 
the legislation creating the Department of the Interior was drafted by Treasury at the request of the 
Ways and Means Committee); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 582 
(2009) (discussing agency involvement in drafting legislation, how an agency shares its interpretation 
with legislative staff, and how Congress relies on agencies when enacting legislation); Robert A. 
Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 656-61 (2012) (discussing the role of 
federal agencies in the legislative process and asserting that “[a]gency sensitivity to Congress’s 
workways reflects an often-intimate involvement in the legislative process”); Nicholas R. Parrillo, 
Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative 
History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 340-41 (2013) (discussing the role of federal agencies in 
preparing bills, appearing at committee hearings, and helping to develop bills’ legislative histories); 
Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency 
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347-49 (1990) 
[hereinafter Strauss, Agency Interpretation] (discussing the significance of an agency’s relationship to 
Congress in understanding legislative histories). 
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Frankfurter observed back in 1942 that “[f]rom the very beginning of our 
government in 1789, federal legislation like that now under review has usually 
not only been sponsored but actually drafted by the appropriate executive 
agency.”15 In 1961, James Craig Peacock echoed Justice Frankfurter’s observation: 
For it cannot be overlooked that, in Washington, at least, the extent to which 
the spade work in the actual drafting of important legislation has been shifted 
all the way back to the agency level, is a major phenomenon of present day 
government . . . . Indeed, the executive branch of the Government is no 
longer even expected to confine itself to the mere making of recommendations 
or proposals. It is practically expected to implement them in the form of 
already drafted bills.16 
In other words, “[b]ecause agencies have day-to-day experience with the legal, 
political, and operational aspects of the laws,” as Clinton Brass of the 
Congressional Research Service has explained, “[i]t is not surprising that a 
fair proportion of the legislation that is considered in the legislative process 
tends to have been drafted or influenced at some point by executive branch 
employees, including both career civil servants and political appointees.”17 
Recent empirical work has provided additional insight into the role of 
federal agencies in the legislative process. For instance, Lisa Bressman and 
Abbe Gluck have surveyed over one hundred congressional staffers and 
reported that “25% and 34% of our respondents told us that first drafts are 
typically written by, respectively, the White House and agencies, or policy 
experts and outside groups, like lobbyists”; however, “[e]mpirical work is 
lacking for the details of this account . . . .”18 In another article, the author 
 
15 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 177 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
16 JAMES CRAIG PEACOCK, NOTES ON LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 2-3 (1961); accord DONALD 
HIRSCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFTING FEDERAL LAW 1 (1980) (“Virtually 
all major programs of federal financial assistance, and most of the significant regulatory statutes, 
have in their ancestries a proposal made to Congress by an executive agency, customarily in the form 
of a draft bill. Generally speaking, these proposals are developed with greater formality than bills 
written within Congress.”). 
17 Clinton T. Brass, Working in, and Working with, the Executive Branch, in LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 271, 275 (Tobias A. Dorsey ed., 2006); accord JACK 
DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL § 25-3 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that 
“[g]overnment agencies bring many bills to every legislature”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too 
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 
(2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing] (observing that for most legislation “[t]he 
agency may have helped to draft the statutory language, and was likely present and attentive 
throughout its legislative consideration”). 
18 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II]; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and 
the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 998-1010 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] 
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similarly surveyed over one hundred federal agency rule drafters (not agency 
legislative drafters), and their responses reinforce that federal agencies play 
an important and substantial role in the legislative process.19 According to the 
author’s survey, about four in five (78%) agency rule drafters indicated that 
their agency always or often participates in a technical drafting role for 
statutes their agency administers (and another 15% indicated “sometimes”); 
roughly three in five (59%) reported that their agency always or often 
participates in a policy or substantive drafting role for the statutes they 
administer (and another 27% indicated “sometimes”).20 In other words, recent 
empirical work confirms what has long been noted anecdotally in the 
literature and what anyone who has participated in the legislative process has 
no doubt observed firsthand: federal agencies are involved regularly and 
extensively in the legislative process.21 
 
(detailing survey findings of congressional drafters on agency involvement in legislative process); 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) (discussing responses from a case study of legislative drafting in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee about the role of agency officials in drafting statutes and conducting 
legal research). And Judge Richard Posner has recently joined Professors Bressman and Gluck in 
calling for more empirical investigation into the role of federal agencies in the legislative process. 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 102 n.33 
(2016) (“An interesting subject of further study would be the legislative drafters in federal agencies 
and in lobbyist firms.”). 
19 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1036-38 
(2015) [hereinafter Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation] (detailing findings from a survey of 
128 agency rule drafters that found “agencies play a significant role in the technical and substantive 
drafting of statutes and even some role in the creation of legislative history”). 
20 Id. at 1037 & fig.6. These responses are no doubt conservative estimates of agency involvement 
with Congress, as the agency officials surveyed were regulatory personnel, not necessarily agency 
officials who are actively involved in the legislative process. See id. (noting lower rates of personal 
participation in the legislative process from the agency rule drafters surveyed). Moreover, about one 
in four (24%) respondents indicated that their agency participates “in drafting legislative history 
(e.g., floor statements, committee reports, conference reports, hearing testimony and questions, etc.) 
of statutes the agency administers.” Id. at 1037-38. 
21 Moreover, in the 1970s several empirical studies were conducted on the role of federal 
agencies in drafting substantive legislative proposals. See DAVIES, supra note 17, § 25-3 (focusing 
solely on “[a]gency bill making”); HIRSCH, supra note 16, at vii (explaining its purpose, along with an 
accompanying seminar, “to train program lawyers of what used to be the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, so that under the guidance of experienced legislative draftsmen they could 
help write the bills, in the areas of their counseling experience, for HEW’s annual legislative 
program”); PROFESSIONALIZING LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 5-95 
(Reed Dickerson ed., 1973) (exploring further agency-initiated substantive legislation); Brass, supra 
note 17, at 271-93 (focusing primarily on agency’s role in substantive legislative activities); Robert S. 
Gilmour, Central Legislative Clearance: A Revised Perspective, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150, 150-58 (1971) 
(exploring the process within the agency that takes place prior to seeking legislative clearance from 
the Executive Office of the President). Perhaps the most ambitious study to date comes from the 
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legislative Drafting which, under the direction 
of Reed Dickerson, commissioned the editors of the Catholic University Law Review to conduct 
interviews and develop case studies on how federal agencies draft and advocate for agency-initiated 
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Before turning to the role of federal agencies in providing technical drafting 
assistance, it is helpful to situate that process within the administrative state’s 
larger legislative role.22 Federal agencies engage in two categories of legislative 
activities: “substantive” and “technical.” 
An executive agency’s “substantive” legislative activities are generally 
governed by the OMB coordination and preclearance process under Circular 
A-19.23 OMB considers the following to be substantive legislative activity: the 
agency’s annual legislative program, any agency “proposed legislation,” and 
any agency legislative “report.”24 “Proposed legislation” is defined broadly to 
include “[a] draft bill or any supporting document . . . that an agency wishes to 
present to Congress for its consideration” as well as “any proposal for or 
endorsement of Federal legislation” that the agency desires “to transmit to 
Congress, or to any Member or committee, officer or employee of Congress, 
or staff of any committee or Member, or to make available to any study group, 
commission, or the public.”25 “Report” includes “[a]ny written expression of 
official views prepared by an agency on a pending bill for (1) transmittal to any 
committee, Member, officer or employee of Congress, or staff of any committee 
or Member, or (2) presentation as testimony before a congressional committee.”26 
In other words, substantive legislative activity involves the agency expressing 
a policy or substantive view on legislation, including the introduction of its own 
proposed legislation. These activities—at least for executive agencies—generally 
require White House preclearance; it may also require interagency coordination.27 
The White House follows a similar process when soliciting agency feedback 
to be included in Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) for major bills 
pending in Congress.28 
 
substantive legislation. The Catholic University Law Review published its nearly 200-page report in 
1972. The Catholic University Study of Federal Legislative Drafting in the Executive Branch, 21 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 703 (1972). The report presented findings as to the role of the administrative state in the 
legislative process at seven federal agencies. Id. at 709-10. Like nearly all of the scholarship and 
empirical work done to date, these rich case studies focused almost exclusively on agency-initiated 
substantive legislation. See id. at 705-06 (explaining that the ABA-commissioned study “concentrate[d] 
on legislative proposals originating in about a half dozen representative agencies”). 
22 For a more comprehensive treatment on which this summary draws, see generally Walker, 
Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 5-11. 
23 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-19: Legislative Coordination 
and Clearance (last revised Sept. 20, 1979), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a019/ [https://
perma.cc/DQ4A-VEHR] [hereinafter OMB Circular A-19]. 
24 Id. §§ 6-7. 
25 Id. § 5(c). 
26 Id. § 5(e). 
27 See id. § 8 (detailing the OMB clearance process for agency proposed legislation and reports); 
see also id. § 9 (detailing the interagency consultation process). 
28 See Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget on Legislative Coordination & Clearance 
to the Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies 3 (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7RG-HT8G] (“OMB prepares SAPs for major 
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Unlike substantive legislative activity, when agencies engage in technical 
drafting assistance they provide feedback on congressionally drafted legislation 
without taking an official substantive or policy position on the legislation. 
OMB contemplates that federal agencies will provide technical drafting 
assistance, but it does not require OMB preclearance for such technical 
feedback.29 Nor does OMB define technical drafting assistance. Indeed, a 
proper definition has been elusive, as underscored during the interviews 
conducted for this study. Fortunately, Ganesh Sitaraman has provided a 
helpful definition: 
Technical assistance refers to help from the executive branch on specific 
(hence technical) policy or drafting issues. For example, the head of an office 
at the FDA can tell congressional staff how existing provisions are being 
interpreted, how a suggested draft would change that interpretation, what the 
policy consequences would be, and how resource-intense a new policy would 
be for the agency. Technical assistance can also extend to the agency drafting, 
editing, or commenting on legislative language.30 
As the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has 
further explained, “Congress frequently requests technical assistance from 
agencies on proposed legislation. Congressional requests for technical 
assistance in statutory drafting can range from review of draft legislation to 
requests for the agency to draft legislation based on specifications provided 
by the Congressional requester.”31 The findings from this study, summarized 
in Section I.B, shed unprecedented empirical light on the role of federal 
 
bills scheduled for House or Senate floor action in the coming week, including those to be considered by 
the House Rules Committee. In addition, SAPs are sometimes prepared for so-called ‘noncontroversial’ 
bills considered in the House under suspension of the rules. SAPs are prepared in coordination with 
other parts of OMB, the agency or agencies principally concerned, and other EOP units.”). 
29 Instead, OMB Circular A-19 merely instructs agencies to keep OMB apprised of such 
activities and to make clear to the congressional requester that the agency feedback does not 
represent the substantive views of the agency or the Administration. OMB Circular A-19, supra note 23, 
§ 7(i). To do that, agencies typically provide a disclaimer along the following lines: “This technical 
drafting assistance is provided in response to a congressional request and is not intended to reflect 
the viewpoint or policies of any element of the Agency, the Department, or the Administration.” 
Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 9. Moreover, the findings from this 
study reveal that the Circular A-19 notice requirement for technical drafting assistance is routinely 
neither followed by agencies nor enforced by OMB—and that agency technical drafting assistance 
is typically done on a confidential basis. 
30 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 107; accord Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 
78,161-62 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Rather than originating with the agency or the Administration, in the 
case of technical assistance, Congress originates the draft legislation and asks an agency to review 
and provide feedback on the draft. Circular A-19 advises agencies to keep OMB informed of their 
activities and to clarify that agency feedback does not reflect the views or policies of the agency or 
Administration.”). 
31 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
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agencies in the legislative process and suggest a number of implications for 
theories of agency statutory interpretation and judicial review thereof, which 
are further discussed in Parts II and III. 
B. Findings from the Empirical Study 
Despite some prior investigation into the role of federal agencies in 
proposing substantive legislation for congressional consideration, virtually no 
work has been done until now to document the role of the administrative state 
in legislating in the shadows via agency technical drafting assistance.32 In 
2015, ACUS sought to remedy that deficiency by commissioning a study, 
which the author conducted, on agency technical assistance in statutory 
drafting. To better understand the process, the author met with agency 
officials at some twenty executive departments and independent agencies for 
over sixty hours of interviews. Ten of these agencies agreed to participate on 
the record: the Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Homeland Security; 
Education; Energy; Health and Human Services; Housing and Urban 
Development; and Labor, as well as the Federal Reserve and the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation.33 The participating agencies then responded 
to an anonymous follow-up survey that consisted of forty questions concerning 
their technical drafting assistance processes and practices.34 
The findings from this study are set forth in the ninety-page final report 
that the author submitted to ACUS,35 which also formed the basis for a set of 
recommendations ACUS adopted and published in the Federal Register.36 Prior 
drafts of the report were discussed at two separate meetings of the ACUS 
Rulemaking Committee, circulated to the various agencies participating in the 
study and other interested parties for comment and review, and posted on the 
ACUS website for public comment.37 Those findings will not be repeated in 
full here. Instead, this Part focuses on summarizing the findings most relevant 
for the purposes of this Article and depicting how technical assistance is 
 
32 See Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 107, 107-08 n.155 (reviewing literature and concluding that 
“[d]espite its importance in the drafting process, technical assistance has hitherto only been 
mentioned in passing in legal scholarship—and even then, infrequently”). 
33 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 11-12 (detailing study 
methodology). Individual overviews of these agencies’ processes for providing technical drafting 
assistance are included as Appendices B–K to the ACUS report. Id. at 48-90. 
34 The survey and full responses are reproduced as Appendix A to the ACUS report. Id. at 43-47. In 
this Article, the questions (and the relevant subquestions) from the survey are cited to with a prefix “Q.” 
35 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra 1. 
36 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,161-63 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
37 For the various public drafts of the report and recommendations, meeting minutes, and other 
project documents posted on the ACUS website, see Technical Assistance by Federal Agencies in the 
Legislative Process, ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S., https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/technical-assis
tance-federal-agencies-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/47LX-SCMH]. 
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typically requested, provided, and received—at least from the perspective of 
the agency officials interviewed and surveyed. 
1. The Congressional Request 
How the process begins is quite typical across agencies.38 A staffer for a 
congressional committee or for an individual member of Congress—usually 
the former—reaches out to the agency and requests technical assistance on 
draft legislation. Sometimes, though rarely, the request comes from a member 
of Congress directly, but oftentimes the staffer makes the request before the 
member has been presented with the draft bill. The congressional staffer 
usually has already drafted some proposed bill language and explains what 
that language attempts to accomplish. The staffer expects the agency to 
provide general feedback—often with suggested edits and redlines to the 
draft language. On rare occasions, the congressional staffer has not yet drafted 
the bill and instead provides a set of specifications for the legislation, with 
the request that the agency develop the first draft. 
Most of these requests for technical drafting assistance occur before the 
proposed legislation has been introduced in Congress, though sometimes the 
initial request arrives after the legislation has been introduced during, for 
instance, the committee markup stage. (Sometimes the agency offers technical 
assistance on proposed legislation without an express congressional request.) 
In all of these instances, the congressional requester generally expects the request 
and response to remain confidential. That expectation of confidentiality was 
repeatedly emphasized in the interviews with agency officials. Seldom does 
the technical drafting assistance process end with the initial response. The agency 
routinely remains involved in providing technical drafting assistance—often 
coupled with substantive legislative assistance via the OMB process—as the 
proposed legislation works its way through the legislative process. 
The agency officials interviewed underscored that the technical drafting 
assistance process is quite informal and often driven by existing relationships 
between congressional staffers and various agency officials. One agency 
official, for instance, remarked, “When the real work gets done, it’s the subject 
matter experts at the agency and at the congressional committee that interact. 
I can guarantee you that they have their direct lines.”39 These informal 
communications notwithstanding, the congressional requester’s initial formal 
agency contact is typically the agency’s legislative affairs office; this is the 
agency’s official liaison with Congress and manages all agency communications 
 
38 The findings with respect to the congressional request process summarized here are set forth 
in greater detail in Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 12-16, 33-35. 
39 Id. at 13. 
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and interactions with the Hill.40 For executive branch agencies, this office 
consists mainly of, or at least is directed by, political appointees. 
It is important to note that although these requests are officially for “technical” 
drafting assistance, the agency officials interviewed repeatedly emphasized 
that the congressional staffer often really also wants to receive the agency’s 
substantive feedback on the proposed legislation. Sometimes, the agency 
officials explained, the congressional staffer just wants to know if the 
proposed legislation would make good policy. Other times, as one official 
explained, “the [congressional] staffer wants to sell it to the Member and 
being able to say that the agency says it’s okay or has worked on it” helps 
make that sale to the staffer’s boss.41 
In sum, this technical drafting assistance process takes place confidentially, 
often before legislation has even been introduced in Congress, in an informal 
process between agency and congressional personnel with a preexisting 
working relationship. During this process, moreover, the congressional staffer 
does not want just “technical” assistance, but also “substantive” feedback—at 
least informally and off the record—that OMB Circular A-19 arguably 
contemplates should go through White House preclearance. 
Indeed, even the agency officials interviewed expressed confusion about 
the difference between technical and substantive feedback. As one agency 
official put it, “The technical–substantive distinction involves a lot of 
judgment; it’s a smell test.”42 Moreover, a comment by one agency official 
interviewed for the Shobe study echoes a number of comments made by 
agency officials interviewed for this study: “The more policy oriented it gets 
the more levels of bureaucracy it has to be cleared through . . . . If I want to 
provide policy input but don’t want to go through a bunch of layers of 
bureaucracy then I pick up the phone.”43 These findings illustrate some of the 
important aspects of how legislating in the shadows takes place. 
The agencies also reported that the amount of technical drafting assistance 
on proposed legislation is substantial. Agency officials interviewed uniformly 
indicated that the number of congressionally drafted bills for which they provide 
technical assistance is much greater than the number of agency-initiated 
substantive bills (those that would go through the OMB Circular A-19 
 
40 In the anonymous follow-up survey, the agency respondents indicated that the agency’s 
legislative affairs staff is either always (40%), usually (50%), or often (10%) involved in the agency’s 
response. Id. at app. A (Q3(a)). 
41 Id. at 34. In the anonymous follow-up survey, respondents either agreed (40%) or somewhat 
agreed (60%) that “what congressional staffers often really want is to know the agency’s substantive 
position on the proposed legislation.” Id. at app. A (Q6(d)). 
42 Id. at 34. 
43 Shobe, supra note 13, at 490. 
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preclearance process).44 There also seemed to be a general consensus among 
agency officials interviewed that their agency provides technical assistance 
during the drafting phase on nearly all of the bills that ultimately get enacted 
that directly affect their agency. They seemed less confident about bills that 
only indirectly affect their agency, and feedback was mixed among agencies 
about appropriations legislation.45 
These findings are consistent with prior empirical work. In particular, of 
the fifty-four agency staffers involved in legislative matters who were 
surveyed in 2014 as part of the Shobe study, almost two in three indicated 
that their agency plays “at least some role” in 100% of the legislation that is 
enacted in the areas covered by the agency; and nearly all of the remaining 
staffers indicated that their agency plays at least some role in 75% to 99% of 
such enacted legislation.46 
2. The Agency Response 
How agencies respond is also quite typical across agencies.47 The agency 
officials interviewed uniformly indicated that their agency responds to just 
about every congressional request for technical drafting assistance that the 
agency receives—regardless of the political party affiliation of the requesting 
member (whether a part of the minority or majority party in Congress, or 
whether a member of the President’s party), the effect the legislation would 
have on the agency’s policy objectives, the deadline the congressional requester 
has set for response, the resources available to the agency to respond, the 
likelihood of such legislation actually being enacted, or any other factor. The 
agency respondents’ anonymous responses in the follow-up survey generally 
support these interview responses.48 
At first blush, this finding may be surprising. After all, one may assume 
that politics—or at least policy preferences—would influence whether an 
agency decides to help a congressional requester on proposed legislation. But 
the agency officials underscored a number of reasons why the settled norm is 
to respond to virtually every request.49 First and foremost, it is critical that 
 
44 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
45 The anonymous follow-up survey generally confirmed these impressions. See id. at 13-16 & fig.1. 
46 Shobe, supra note 13, at 482-83 & fig.8; see also id. at 476 & fig.5 (“Forty-eight respondents 
(89%) said that Congress often or always requests agency review, only one respondent said rarely 
(2%), and no respondents said never.”). 
47 The findings with respect to the agency response are set forth in greater detail in Walker, 
Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 16-26, 30-32. 
48 See id. at 16-20 & fig.2. 
49 See also Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (stating 
that providing Congress with technical drafting assistance is worthwhile because it “assists the agency 
in maintaining a healthy and productive relationship with Congress, ensures the proposed legislation 
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federal agencies maintain a healthy and productive working relationship with 
Congress. Indiscriminately providing technical drafting assistance helps on 
that front. Moreover, providing technical drafting assistance helps ensure that 
the proposed legislation does not unnecessarily disrupt the existing statutory 
(and regulatory) scheme. In other words, agencies provide technical drafting 
assistance on proposed legislation that will affect them to ensure that the 
legislation is technically correct—even if they do not necessarily agree with 
all, or even much, of the proposed legislation’s substance. As one of the agency 
respondents in the Shobe study observed, 
Sometimes there are bills we don’t like, but we still try to make it the best we 
can. When we give technical assistance we are trying to help the drafter make 
the bill the best we can even if we don’t like it. If it ultimately passes it is 
better that we have input than not.50 
Similarly, even if the proposed legislation is unlikely to be enacted, 
providing technical drafting assistance helps educate the congressional 
staffers about the agency’s existing statutory and regulatory framework. The 
importance of congressional educational efforts was a recurring theme during 
the agency interviews and in responses to the follow-up survey. And it became 
one of the main recommendations that ACUS ultimately adopted: encouraging 
agencies to be “actively engaged in educational efforts, including in-person 
briefings and interactions, to educate Congressional staff about the agencies’ 
respective statutory and regulatory frameworks and agency technical drafting 
expertise.”51 Finally, one agency official noted that the agency provides technical 
drafting assistance because it serves as “a very good source of intelligence.”52 
By responding to nearly all technical drafting assistance requests from members 
of Congress and thus encouraging congressional staffers to submit such requests 
on any legislation they are contemplating, the agency is better able to 
anticipate, monitor, and respond to potential legislative proposals that could 
affect the agency and its regulatory activities. 
Even though federal agencies respond to nearly every congressional 
technical drafting assistance request,53 this does not mean that the agencies 
 
is consonant with the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, helps educate Congressional staff 
about the agency’s statutory and regulatory framework, and keeps the agency informed of potential 
legislative action that could affect the agency”). 
50 Shobe, supra note 13, at 477. 
51 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
52 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 18. 
53 In the Shobe study, however, at least one agency official stated that the agency was less likely 
to provide assistance on a bill to which the agency was opposed or which had little chance of passage. 
See Shobe, supra note 13, at 478 (“[I]f our department hates a bill, we don’t want to fix it for them 
because from our perspective it can’t be fixed. If we strongly oppose the bill we are not going to help 
them make technical changes to make it better.”); id. at 479 (“There are lots of bills drafted in Congress 
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respond the same way to each request. The various factors listed above could 
still affect how much time, energy, and detail are provided for a particular 
request. For instance, as one agency official remarked, “The agency always 
responds to technical comments requests; we may put more or less time or 
resources into requests that come from, for example, our authorizing committees 
versus another, more tangentially-related committee.”54 Another respondent 
nicely summarized the majority view shared during the interviews: 
We strive to accommodate all requests and do so “blind” to the chamber, to 
the majority or minority status of the requesting party, to the nature of the 
request (i.e., from committee staff or Member staff), or [to] the likelihood of 
action. Those elements, however, may affect the priority placed on the 
assistance provided. If anything, scope and timing dictate the amount of 
assistance provided. Rarely, do we refuse to provide assistance, and only if 
there is good cause to do so (e.g., the request goes to legislation that is 
repugnant to public policy or the interests of the United States).55 
Not surprisingly, ACUS formally endorsed the distinction between whether 
and how to respond to congressional requests, recommending that “[f]ederal 
agencies should endeavor to provide Congress with technical drafting 
assistance when asked,” but that “[a]gencies should recognize that they need 
not expend the same amount of time and resources on each request.”56 
The agency officials expressed less consensus with respect to the format of an 
agency’s response to a technical drafting assistance request.57 In the interviews, 
many agency officials explained that the process of providing technical 
assistance is highly informal and that much of it takes place orally instead of 
in writing. One agency official’s comment during an interview is reflective of 
at least a half dozen other agency officials who remarked on the form of the 
technical assistance: “Try to avoid redlining and avoid email. . . . Sometimes 
we draft up talking points or comments, but almost always try to find a way 
to just pick up the phone.”58 
The anonymous follow-up survey, however, provided conflicting responses. 
The agency respondents indicated that the predominant form of feedback 
 
that are never going to see the light of day. Those are usually in response to a specific constituent’s 
request and we don’t really bother looking at those.”). 
54 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 19. 
55 Id.; see also Shobe, supra note 13, at 506 (“[M]any respondents reported different interactions 
with congressional staff that are not from the same party as the President. Twenty-eight respondents 
(52%) said their interactions are often or always different, and another fourteen respondents (26%) 
said their interactions are sometimes different. This is despite the fact that many respondents said 
that they try to offer assistance to both parties.”); id. at 490 & fig.11. 
56 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
57 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 24. 
58 Id. 
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takes place in writing.59 For instance, all respondents indicated that their 
agency usually (30%) or often (70%) provides “[w]ritten feedback in a form 
other than a redline or actual draft legislation (for example, email or memo 
summarizing technical feedback).”60 Similarly, four in five respondents indicated 
that their agency usually (40%) or often (40%) transmits an “[a]gency redline 
of draft legislation provided by congressional staffer,” with the remainder 
indicating sometimes.61 By contrast, only three in five respondents indicated 
that their agency usually (20%) or often (40%) uses “[o]ral communication of 
comments and suggestions” to provide technical drafting assistance, with the 
remainder indicating that oral communication is sometimes (30%) or rarely 
(10%) used.62 To be sure, these options are not mutually exclusive; the agency 
officials indicated during interviews and in their survey responses that there 
is often overlap between oral and written feedback. But even so, these survey 
responses indicate that the idea that agencies try to avoid providing written 
technical feedback seems misplaced, or at least overstated. 
In light of the general congressional expectation that the technical 
drafting assistance process remain confidential, a review of the substance of 
agency responses to technical assistance exceeded the scope of this study. 
During the interviews and follow-up surveys, however, some general themes 
emerged. First, as detailed in subsection II.B.2, agency officials consistently 
expressed concern and frustration with the lack of congressional awareness of 
the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, the poor quality of legislative 
drafting by congressional staffers, and the rapid turnover among congressional 
staffers.63 Because congressional staffers often propose legislation that would 
duplicate existing law or unintentionally conflict with existing statutory (and 
regulatory) schemes, the agency officials explained that their agency responses 
are often quite extensive and detailed. However, as discussed above, the length 
and depth of agency responses vary based on a number of factors, including 
the reasonableness of the deadline to provide technical drafting assistance and 
the likelihood of enactment. 
A number of agency officials indicated that they provide detailed technical 
drafting assistance—even when there is little likelihood of the legislation 
being enacted—as a means of educating congressional staffers on the current 
statutory and regulatory framework and on what the agency is presently 
doing to address the problem.64 To further educate congressional staffers on 
how the proposed legislation would affect existing law, for instance, a few 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 32-33.  
64 Id. at 17. 
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agencies provide not just a redlined version of the proposed legislation, but 
also a redlined version of the existing law that shows what the proposed 
legislation would change.65 Indeed, based on this study’s findings, ACUS 
adopted the recommendation that, “[w]hen feasible and appropriate, agencies 
should provide the Congressional requester a redline draft showing how the 
bill would modify existing law (known as a Ramseyer/Cordon draft) as part 
of the technical assistance response.”66 
Perhaps due in part to these agency perceptions of congressional drafter 
ignorance or inexperience, many of the agency officials interviewed noted 
that a primary objective in providing technical drafting assistance is to preserve 
the current statutory scheme and the agency’s accompanying regulatory 
authority.67 When asked to expand on what this means, one agency official 
invoked the medical analogy of “first, do no harm.” Indeed, a general theme 
emerged during the interviews that most legislative activity initiated in 
Congress has the potential to harm the agency’s current authority, so in many 
circumstances the agency’s primary objective is to minimize the harm and 
preserve the agency’s existing regulatory authority. 
Others noted that their goal is to preserve “flexibility” in the current 
statutory framework. A few mentioned that one way to do that is to ensure 
that proposed legislation is drafted “broadly” to maintain agency flexibility 
in implementing the statutory mandate. Although no agency official expressly 
stated that the agency’s goal is to draft the statute as ambiguously as possible 
so that interpretive authority is delegated to the agency itself, the overall 
themes of “flexibility,” “drafting broadly,” and “preserving regulatory authority” 
were quite common in the agency interviews conducted for this study. 
Finally, with respect to who at the agency is involved in providing 
technical drafting assistance, the agency officials reported that the main actors 
are typically those within the agency with expertise in the substantive subject 
matter in addition to those with expertise in legislative drafting.68 In other 
words, although the legislative affairs staff may be the congressional liaison 
and gatekeeper, the program and policy experts and the agency’s legislative 
counsel quickly become involved in providing comments and reviewing the 
proposed legislation.69 For some agencies, the regulatory counsel are also 
involved, but that is not the case at most agencies.70 That finding is discussed 
further in Section II.A. 
 
65 Id. at 37. 
66 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
67 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 17. 
68 Id. at 21. For a more detailed breakdown, see id. at 21-23 & fig.3. 
69 Id. at 21. 
70 Id. 
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The agency officials also indicated that the White House is generally not 
involved in technical drafting assistance and that private parties, including 
regulated entities or other outside organizations, are rarely involved in 
developing the agency’s response. Similarly, despite the requirement in OMB 
Circular A-19 that agencies provide notice to OMB of any technical drafting 
assistance requested or provided, the agency officials indicated that their 
agency generally does not provide such notice, nor does OMB request it.71 
3. The Congressional Reply 
Although the study did not endeavor to interview or survey congressional 
staffers on how they reply to agency technical drafting assistance, the follow-up 
survey of the agency officials explored which factors the agencies perceived 
as affecting whether the congressional requester accepted the agency’s technical 
feedback on proposed legislation.72 
Before proceeding to the findings from these follow-up survey questions, 
it is appropriate to note the methodological limitations of this ACUS study, 
which focused on presenting the perspectives of federal agencies—not 
congressional staffers—in the legislative process. Although the ACUS study 
provides a critical empirical window into technical drafting assistance, it is 
obviously an incomplete one. Congressional staffers may well disagree about 
the rate at which they request technical drafting assistance and the factors 
that affect whether they seek such assistance (such as whether there is divided 
government or whether the member of Congress is of the President’s party). 
They may also disagree about the rate at which they accept agency technical 
drafting assistance. Much more empirical work needs to be done to fully 
understand the process. 
Turning to the congressional reply, the questions in the follow-up survey 
build on findings from the Shobe study, where the agency officials surveyed 
“overwhelmingly reported that Congress accepts technical comments,” with 
nearly all (96%) respondents reporting that Congress does so always or often.73 
Similar to the responses concerning the factors affecting whether the agency 
decides to provide the requested technical assistance, the identity and politics 
of the congressional requester do not seem to matter too much.74 But other 
factors do seem to be important. 
 
71 The ACUS study expressly did not explore the role of OMB in the legislative process. See 
id. at 33. As noted in the report and this Article, however, agency officials volunteered many observations 
about how their agency interacted with OMB in providing substantive and technical drafting 
assistance in the legislative process. Id. at 33-35. 
72 For greater detail with respect to findings regarding the congressional reply, see id. at 26-28. 
73 Shobe, supra note 13, at 481 & fig.7. 
74 Id. 
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For instance, the stage of the legislative process at which the technical 
assistance is provided seems to matter. Three in five (60%) agency respondents 
indicated that it often appears to matter whether technical assistance was 
offered “prior to the legislation being introduced (as opposed to, for instance, 
at the committee markup stage or later).”75 Another three in ten (30%) 
indicated this timing sometimes matters, while the remainder (10%) indicated 
it only rarely matters.76 This is consistent with the Shobe study, where a few 
respondents reported that the timing of the agency’s comments mattered, 
with one respondent stating: “After the markup . . . if we want to raise an issue 
we really have to push hard because no one wants us to be bringing up issues. 
You have to convince them to make changes at that point.”77 It similarly seems 
to matter whether the proposed legislation is likely to be enacted. Three in 
five agency respondents reported that the likelihood of enactment seems to 
always (10%) or often (50%) matter, while another three in ten (30%) indicated 
it sometimes matters and the remainder (10%) indicated it only rarely matters.78 
Another theme that emerged during the agency interviews was that 
relationships matter. Indeed, of the eight factors included in the survey, the 
agency–congressional relationship received the highest composite score of 3.9 
(where a score of 4.0 equals often).79 Three in five respondents indicated that 
it usually (30%) or often (30%) seems to matter “[w]hether there is a strong 
working relationship between the agency officials involved and the congressional 
staffers requesting assistance,” while the remainder of respondents indicated 
that working relationships “sometimes” matter.80 Agency officials indicated 
that another factor that matters to Congress is, somewhat surprisingly, the 
format of the technical assistance. Seven in ten respondents indicated that 
“[w]hether the technical assistance consists of suggested redlined changes to 
draft legislation (as opposed to more generalized feedback)” usually (10%) or 
often (60%) matters, with the remainder indicating it sometimes (20%) or 
rarely (10%) matters.81 Perhaps agency perceptions that Congress is more 
likely to incorporate feedback delivered in writing explain why agencies 
provide feedback in writing, rather than just doing so orally. 
 
75 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 27. 
76 Id.  
77 Shobe, supra note 13, at 480 n.106. 
78 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 45. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 46. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATING IN THE SHADOWS 
As the findings outlined in Part I suggest, this previously underexplored 
yet widespread practice of legislating in the shadows has important doctrinal, 
theoretical, and normative implications for administrative law. 
Many of these implications involve a more nuanced understanding of the 
principal–agent relationship between Congress and the regulatory state.82 
The potentially terrific news is that there is a strong, ongoing relationship 
between members of Congress and federal agencies. The congressional 
principal and its bureaucratic agents communicate regularly to improve the 
instructions that the principal provides to its agents to implement policy, 
while also leveraging agency expertise in amending the law via the legislative 
process. Such a working relationship, especially the practice of agencies 
providing technical drafting assistance on proposed legislation, should be 
encouraged and strengthened. The less ideal news may be that the bureaucratic 
agents appear to have more influence over shaping the authority delegated to 
them by their congressional principal than previously appreciated—precisely 
because they can heavily influence the scope and character of their legislative 
mandates.83 These permutations of the bureaucratic principal–agent model 
will be further explored in this Part. 
This Article focuses on two implications of legislating in the shadows that 
emerge from this more nuanced understanding of the bureaucratic principal–agent 
model. First, this phenomenon could support the growing scholarly call that 
agencies should be allowed to engage in more purposivist interpretation than 
their judicial counterparts. Second, it may cast some doubt on the foundations 
for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, in light of federal 
 
82 See supra notes 3–4 (reviewing literature on principal–agency theory in administrative law). 
83 Indeed, this relationship may be further complicated by the fact that numerous agency 
officials are detailed to Congress each year—with their agency covering the cost of such details. For 
instance, over 200 agency officials detailed in Congress during the 113th Congress. See S. REP. NO. 
114-112, at 11-18 (2015) (listing all of the approved details by agency and congressional committee). 
See generally Memorandum on Detail of Law Enforcement Agents to Congressional Committees 
from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Acting Deputy 
Att’y Gen. (Sept. 13, 1988), https://www.justice.gov/file/24116/download [https://perma.cc/ZCQ6-
TSFW] (concluding that such details are statutorily authorized, that they “do not violate the 
principle of separation of powers as long as the details are advisory in nature and involve functions 
not required by the Constitution to be performed by an ‘officer’ of the United States,” but that the 
agency should carefully consider conflicts that could arise); Memorandum of Department of Justice 
Attorneys to Congressional Committees from John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, to the Dir. of the Dep’t of Justice Task Force on Criminal Code Revision (May 
16, 1977), https://www.justice.gov/file/21051/download [https://perma.cc/A3Z3-XXTH] (concluding 
that there would be no ethical problems in a Justice Department attorney being detailed to Congress 
“[i]f the attorney were instead to be viewed as counsel for the Department detailed by the Attorney 
General to work with, rather than for, the [congressional] subcommittee”). Many thanks to Will 
Levy for this point on congressional details. 
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agencies’ involvement in drafting the legislation that ultimately delegates to 
the same agencies the authority to interpret that legislation. Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
A. Implications for Agency Statutory Interpretation 
As Jerry Mashaw observed nearly a decade ago, “virtually no one has even 
asked, much less answered, some simple questions about agency statutory 
interpretation.”84 For example, many assert that the role of legislative history 
should be the same regardless of whether an agency or judge is the interpreter 
or whether legislative history is deemed to reveal congressional intent or 
statutory meaning. Yet in his preliminary inquiry into the matter, Mashaw 
found “persuasive grounds for believing that legitimate techniques and 
standards for agency statutory interpretation diverge sharply from the 
legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory interpretation.”85 
Indeed, nearly a quarter century ago Peter Strauss argued that “[l]egislative 
history has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not 
readily be conceived by persons who are outside government and are accustomed 
to considering its relevance only to actual or prospective judicial resolution 
of discrete disputes.”86 He went on to explain the role of legislative history in 
agency statutory interpretation by describing the law library of a federal agency: 
Alongside the statutes for which the agency is responsible, you will find shelf 
after shelf of their legislative history—collections that embrace not only 
printed materials such as might make their way to a depositary library, but 
also transcripts of relevant hearings, correspondence, and other informal 
traces of the continuing interactions that go on between an agency and 
Capitol Hill as a statute is being shaped in the legislative process, and perhaps 
afterwards in [the] course of implementation.87 
One of the important benefits of “[t]he enduring and multifaceted character 
of the agency’s relationship with Congress,” Strauss explained, is that the 
agency has comparative expertise “to distinguish reliably those considerations 
that served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat, from the 
more manipulative chaff.”88 As Mashaw has noted, although not speaking in 
principal–agent terms, Strauss underscores that “agencies have a direct 
relationship with Congress that gives them insights into legislative purposes 
 
84 Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (2005); see also id. at 502 n.2 (reviewing literature). 
85 Id. at 504. 
86 Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 14, at 329. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 347. 
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and meaning . . . . For a faithful agent to forget this content, to in some sense 
ignore its institutional memory, would be to divest itself of critical resources 
in carrying out congressional designs.”89 
It is perhaps for this reason that a number of administrative law scholars—in 
addition to Mashaw and Strauss—have called for a more purposivist approach 
to agency statutory interpretation (than to judicial interpretation) based on the 
comparative institutional expertise—or the unique “interpretive voice”90—of 
federal agencies. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, have argued 
that “attention to institutional considerations can show why agencies might 
be given the authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be denied 
that authority.”91 Indeed, Sunstein strengthened his call for comparative expertise 
in a recent article aptly entitled The Most Knowledgeable Branch.92 William 
Eskridge has advanced a somewhat analogous position: agencies should “read 
statutes broadly, in light of their purposes, and follow a quasi-legislative 
political process for interpretations addressing big policy questions or arenas 
not resolved by the statute.”93 Kevin Stack and others have reached conclusions 
along similar comparative expertise lines.94 
Sitaraman, moreover, has reached a similar conclusion that “[t]he executive’s 
role in legislative drafting provides additional support to the Strauss-Mashaw 
 
89 See Mashaw, supra note 84, at 511 (discussing Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 14). 
90 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005) (asserting 
that theories of interpretation should “consider[] not only the abilities and limitations of courts and 
administrative agencies, but also how both of these institutions express their conclusions; that is, the 
relationship between what they do and what they say they do”). 
91 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 
928 (2003); accord ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205-08 (2006) (emphasizing the strictly institutional 
justifications for agency deference). See generally Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension 
of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003) (agreeing that there is an 
institutional dimension of legal interpretation but disagreeing that this is a novel insight, as scholars 
and judges have long considered this institutional dimension). 
92 Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2016). 
93 William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 427. 
94 See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 887-900 (2015) (taking the public choice argument further by asserting that 
Congress directs agencies to engage in purposivist statutory interpretation); see also Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 
91-99 (1985) (arguing that delegation of policy decisions to agencies is better than delegation to 
courts based on comparative accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy); David B. Spence & 
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 134-41 (2000) (arguing 
on public choice grounds that lawmaking delegation to agencies is comparatively better than such 
delegation to courts); Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 159-61 
(2012) [hereinafter Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons] (arguing that agencies’ comparative 
expertise is a reason to “discontinu[e] the use of modern constitutional avoidance in the review of 
administrative interpretations of law”). 
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thesis that agency interpretive practice can and should diverge from judicial 
interpretive process.”95 
Empirical studies provide further support for this more purposivist approach 
to agency statutory interpretation. In particular, over nine in ten (94%) 
congressional drafters in the Bressman and Gluck study indicated that a purpose 
of legislative history is to shape the way agencies interpret statutory ambiguities; 
one in five (21%) respondents volunteered that legislative history also provides 
an oversight role for agency implementation of a statute it administers.96 
One congressional drafter explained, “We use everything from floor statements 
to letters to the agency—members know how to communicate with agencies 
and make their policy preferences known . . . .”97 Moreover, over half (53%) of the 
congressional respondents emphasized the importance of legislative history 
in the appropriations context, as such legislative history specifies where the 
funds appropriated go within the administrative state.98 
The author’s prior study of agency rule drafters provides similar support.99 
For instance, three in four (76%) rule drafters considered legislative history 
useful in interpreting statutes, and at least four in five agreed that legislative 
history serves to explain the purposes of a statute (93%) and the meaning of 
particular terms in a statute (80%).100 Of over twenty interpretive principles 
covered in the survey, legislative history had the sixth-highest response for 
use in interpretation: only Chevron deference, the whole act rule, the ordinary 
meaning canon, the Mead doctrine, and noscitur a sociis were reported by more 
rule drafters as being used in their interpretation and rule-drafting efforts.101 
Likewise, the rule drafters surveyed demonstrated, on balance, a sound 
understanding of how to assess the reliability of legislative history, including 
that committee and conference reports are usually the most reliable and that 
floor statements by nonsponsors are the least reliable.102 Many rule drafters 
indicated that the timing of the legislative history matters, whereas whether 
a member of Congress drafted or even read or heard the legislative history 
does not.103 These findings are consistent with those of the congressional 
respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study.104 Moreover, the findings on 
agency expertise in legislative history and process seem to support the 
 
95 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 128. 
96 Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 18, at 768. 
97 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 18, at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 18, at 768. 
99 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19.  
100 Id. at 1020 fig.2, 1041 fig.7. 
101 Id. at 1020 fig.2, 1038-39. 
102 Id. at 1043-44 & fig.8. 
103 Id. at 1043-47 & figs.8-9. 
104 See id. at 1046. 
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scholarly call for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation 
(as compared to a more textualist approach to judicial statutory interpretation). 
One set of findings from the author’s prior study, however, raises some 
questions. Nearly four in five (78%) rule drafters reported that their agencies 
always or often participate in a technical drafting role of statutes they administer, 
and three in five (59%) indicated that their agencies similarly participate in a 
policy or substantive drafting role.105 But the rule drafters reported that their 
personal participation in the legislative process was less involved: 29% always 
or often participate in technical drafting (and 29% sometimes participate); 
18% always or often participate in substantive drafting (and 29% sometimes 
participate).106 In other words, the agency lawyers involved in drafting the rules 
are not necessarily involved in the agency’s efforts to assist Congress in drafting 
the legislation, and thus do not have firsthand expertise in that legislative history. 
The lower personal participation may be explained in part by the 
organizational division in many agency general counsel offices between the 
legislation and regulation staffs. The separation between legislative and 
regulatory functions within an agency’s general counsel office raises a number 
of questions about agency statutory interpretation: Under an agency’s typical 
structure, does the agency’s legislative experience get incorporated into its 
rulemaking activities, such that the Congress–agency relationship Strauss 
detailed actually extends to agency statutory interpretation? Or do the 
legislative experts at the agency only get involved once there is a threat of 
judicial challenge? In light of the theoretical arguments that have been 
advanced about the distinct role legislative history—and purposivism more 
generally—should play in agency statutory interpretation, it is critical to 
better ask and answer these questions. 
The findings from this study on the role federal agencies play in the 
legislative process shed some important light on these questions. As discussed 
above, federal agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast 
majority of the proposed legislation that directly affects them and most 
legislation that is actually enacted. The relationship that emerges from the 
study is perhaps not of the principal–agent variety where Congress dictates 
its wishes to its bureaucratic agents, but a partnership where Congress and 
federal agencies work together to draft legislation that affects the agencies’ 
statutory and regulatory schemes.107 Federal agencies are at the legislative 
table and are deeply involved in the legislative process—at the outset and then 
 
105 Id. at 1037 & fig.6. 
106 Id.  
107 This partnership model, of course, can still be framed in principal–agent terms, just with a 
regulatory agent who is more involved in the congressional principal’s delegation of authority to the 
agent than the traditional principal–agent bureaucratic model may envision. 
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throughout the legislative process—that results in statutes that the agencies 
administer. In that sense, Strauss’s anecdotal depiction of agency expertise in 
legislative history and process is quite accurate. And thus the scholarly call 
for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation seems 
empirically grounded. 
There may be one significant wrinkle, however. Seven in ten agencies 
indicated that the agency’s rulemakers/regulatory counsel are rarely (60%) or 
never (10%) involved; few (10%) indicate that they are sometimes involved; 
and still few (20%) indicate that they are usually involved.108 This generates a 
composite score of 2.6 (where a score of 2.0 indicates rarely and a score of 3.0 
means sometimes).109 This is somewhat surprising. At both the Department 
of Energy and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, for 
instance, the legislative and regulatory counsel are housed in the same 
division within the agency general counsel’s office and cross-train in both 
legislative and regulatory drafting.110 One agency respondent commented 
along these lines: “Legislation/regulatory attorneys are in the same office at 
our agency, so regulatory staff have the same input as the agency’s legislative 
counsel, as appropriate for a given request.”111 
But at most other agencies, these lawyers are not housed in the same 
division and interact far less frequently, at least with respect to legislative 
drafting.112 One respondent noted in the comments that “[o]ur answer (never) 
pertains to staff who are dedicated regulation writers. Other program staff are 
often involved in developing regulations and in the regulatory process; they 
participate more frequent[ly] in developing technical assistance than [d]o 
dedicated regulation writers.”113 
In other words, at most agencies the lawyers who draft the regulations and 
the lawyers who help draft the legislation do not interact in a way that would 
suggest that the agency’s expertise in the legislative history and process that 
 
108 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3(d)). 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 22. 
111 Id. at app. A (Q3 cmt.3). 
112 This disconnect may also cast some doubt on one of the rationales for judicial deference to 
agency statutory interpretations, namely “that agency officials are more knowledgeable of the 
legislative intent since they were direct or indirect participants in the legislative process.” 
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 145 (1990); see also id. (further noting that this argument “can be met by exploiting 
empirical insufficiencies” about actual agency involvement in the legislative process). This argument 
is further explored in Section II.B. 
113 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3 cmt.2). This 
comment may explain the apparent discrepancy between the agency officials surveyed here and those 
surveyed in the Shobe study. Nearly 90% of those surveyed by Shobe indicated that “people within 
agencies who are tasked with day-to-day implementation and administration of agency statutes are 
also involved in the [drafting assistance] review process.” Shobe, supra note 13, at 483. 
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resulted in the legislation is transmitted to the lawyers who actually interpret 
that statute. This concern, however, is likely overstated. After all, seven in ten 
agency respondents indicated that agency program/policy experts either 
always (20%) or usually (50%) participate in providing legislative drafting 
assistance, with the remainder reporting that such participation only sometimes 
(20%) or rarely (10%) occurs.114 This generates a composite score of 4.5 (where 
a score of 4.0 represents often, and 5.0 means usually).115 This is consistent 
with the Shobe study, in which nearly nine in ten (89%) agency officials 
surveyed indicated that they “always notify affected parties within their 
agency of potential legislation.”116 As one agency respondent in the Shobe 
study observed, “We are the technical drafters, but the program clients drive 
the policy. They are the ones carrying out the policy so they know it much 
better than we do.”117 Accordingly, there may not be a direct link between the 
legislative and regulatory lawyers, but the program/policy experts likely 
bridge that gap by consulting with both sets of lawyers during their drafting 
processes. Indeed, one of the eight ACUS recommendations based on this 
study focuses on better leveraging agency expertise along these lines.118 
In sum, these findings on the role of federal agencies in the legislative 
process provide additional empirical support for a more purposivist approach 
to agency statutory interpretation. Federal agencies are deeply involved in 
the legislative process from a technical assistance perspective for statutes that 
directly affect them and thus have a comparative expertise over courts in 
understanding what Congress intended when it enacted the statutes that 
agencies administer. The agency lawyers involved in legislative and regulatory 
drafting may not share that information directly at every agency, but the 
agency policy experts are involved in both processes and likely ensure that 
the rule drafters are familiar with what happened in the legislative process. 
Before turning to the implications of legislating in the shadows for judicial 
review of agency statutory interpretations, it is worth considering one important 
counterargument. Because agencies are at the table and substantially involved 
in the drafting of legislation they ultimately interpret, one could argue for a 
more restrained, textualist approach to agency statutory interpretation. After 
 
114 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3(c)). 
115 Id. 
116 Shobe, supra note 13, at 483. 
117 Id. at 484. 
118 See Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Similarly, 
agencies should consider ways to better identify and involve the appropriate agency experts—in 
particular, the relevant agency policy and program personnel in addition to the legislative drafting 
experts—in the technical drafting assistance process. These efforts may involve, for example, 
establishing an internal agency distribution list for technical drafting assistance requests and 
maintaining an internal list of appropriate agency policy and program contacts.”). 
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all, the agencies already had their opportunity to attempt to clean up the 
statutory text and, the argument would go, should not get another, more 
purposivist bite at the apple. Indeed, in presenting these findings at various 
conferences and workshops, a recurring suggestion has been to consider 
incorporating contract law’s contra proferentem doctrine to construe the 
ambiguous statutory language against the agency drafter.119 
This appears to be a novel suggestion for administrative law, although it 
has been applied in the somewhat related context of government contracting. 
For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that “[t]his principle is appropriately 
accorded considerable emphasis in [the context of a government contract] 
because of the Government’s vast economic resources and stronger bargaining 
position in contract negotiations.”120 As one commentator has noted in that 
context, this principle “is not a method by which the true intent of the parties 
is determined”; instead, contra proferentem “is simply an allocation of the 
burden of ambiguity in contract language on the basis of responsibility for its 
draftsmanship.”121 Indeed, as Michelle Boardman has explained, “Contra 
proferentem is meant to give drafters an incentive to draft cleanly, by construing 
ambiguous language against the drafter.”122 
Although this analogy may have some intuitive appeal (at least for those 
who bemoan the sprawl of the modern administrative state),123 it seems to fail 
for both practical and doctrinal reasons. Practically, because technical drafting 
assistance occurs in the shadows, it is difficult if not impossible for a court to 
ascertain which parts of the statute the agency agreed with, much less actually 
 
119 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (reiterating 
“the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language 
against the interest of the party that drafted it”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or 
a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies 
the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”). 
120 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970). 
121 John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra Proferentem in the Government Contract Interpretation 
Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 380 (1980); accord 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2016 ed.) (“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its 
application does not assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or 
even the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the language used. It is chiefly a 
rule of policy, generally favoring the underdog.”). 
122 Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2006). For more on the normative basis for the rule, see Kenneth S. Abraham, A 
Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 533-44 (1996). 
123 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The administrative state wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life. The 
Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s vast and varied federal bureaucracy and the authority 
administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political activities. [T]he 
administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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helped draft. Doctrinally, the analogy seems too tenuous in light of the fact 
that federal agencies merely assist in drafting statutes; Congress is the party 
that ultimately enacts the legislation. 
Perhaps another way to think about the doctrinal (and practical) flaws is to 
consider whether a court should similarly apply contra proferentem against a 
regulated entity if the statutory language at issue was drafted by industry 
lobbyists. In practice, neither the congressional nor the lobbyist drafter is likely 
to make public which parts of the legislation were drafted or otherwise influenced 
by the lobbyist. Incorporating contra proferentem into statutory interpretation 
would likely only encourage more secrecy. As for the doctrinal concerns, 
bicameralism and presentment make clear that the enacted text is that of 
Congress, not that of the many hands that may have held the pen at various 
times during the legislative process. It is difficult to see how punishing the agency 
(or the lobbyist) for the final legislative product would provide an incentive for 
the agency (or the lobbyist) to draft more clearly when Congress ultimately 
holds the pen at the end of the process. Analogizing the contract-drafting 
process to the legislative process, at least with respect to the policy rationales 
for contra proferentem, is thus ill advised. Moreover, as discussed in Section 
II.B, these concerns are better addressed by adjusting the level of deference 
courts owe to certain agency statutory interpretations. 
B. Implications for Judicial Review 
Whereas the findings of this study regarding the role of federal agencies 
in the legislative process provide strong support for a more purposivist 
approach to agency statutory interpretation, the same findings are more 
mixed with respect to their implications for Chevron deference—the doctrine 
that a reviewing court must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute that the agency administers.124 
On the one hand, judicial deference due to agency expertise—a common 
justification for Chevron deference—may be bolstered by the fact that 
agencies often play a critical role in legislative drafting. On the other, 
specifically because agencies help draft statutes, often in the shadows, courts 
should not defer to every reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguities that 
the agency itself may have helped create; instead, perhaps they should apply 
the less-deferential Skidmore standard based on the agency’s power to persuade.125 
Or, at the very least, the Supreme Court should abandon the broad, bright-line 
Chevron standard reaffirmed by Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in City 
 
124 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
125 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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of Arlington v. FCC,126 and move toward the provision-by-provision approach 
Chief Justice Roberts advocated for in his City of Arlington dissent127 and in 
his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.128 
Each of these three alternatives will be addressed in turn. 
1. The Case for Chevron Deference 
The case for Chevron deference in light of legislating in the shadows will 
be made briefly here, as it is similar to the case for a more purposivist 
approach to agency statutory interpretation set forth in Section II.A. Because 
agency officials are often substantially involved in legislative drafting, they 
have special expertise and knowledge concerning what Congress intends 
when it leaves an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers—or even 
whether Congress intended to speak on the policy question at issue. In other 
words, as Sitaraman argues, the agency may well “have special insight into 
what the goals and intentions behind the legislation actually were, what the 
political and practical compromises were, and how [the members of Congress] 
thought about specific problems throughout the legislative process.”129 
Alongside political accountability and uniformity of federal administrative 
law, agency expertise is considered one of the bedrock rationales for Chevron 
deference and for why Congress delegates primary interpretive authority to 
federal agencies (as opposed to courts).130 Indeed, the Chevron Court itself 
emphasized agency expertise as grounds for deference, noting that Congress 
perhaps “consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level, 
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”131 
Congress delegates interpretive authority to agencies, instead of generalist 
courts, at least in part because those agencies are experts in the subject matter. 
 
126 133 S. Ct. 1864, 1874-75 (2013). 
127 Id. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
128 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015). 
129 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 128. 
130 See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1286-88 (2008) 
(“Administrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in particular regulatory fields offers a 
second popular justification for Chevron deference.”); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why 
Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that “the expertise rationale provides a stronger justification for giving 
deference to agency work product than does the implied delegation theory”); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 866 (2001) (“[Chevron] argues that 
agencies typically have greater expertise about technical and specialized subjects than do courts.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990) 
(“[T]he Chevron approach might well be defended on the ground that the resolution of ambiguities 
in statutes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is one of law, narrowly understood, and 
that agencies are uniquely well situated to make the relevant policy decisions.”). 
131 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).  
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To be sure, Chevron’s expertise justification centered on the agency’s policy 
or technical expertise, not necessarily the agency’s expertise in legislative 
history or statutory drafting. But that is not true of the case law more generally. 
As Justice Scalia noted decades ago, “The cases, old and new, that accept 
administrative interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in 
question, their intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the 
legislation at issue, [and] their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate 
those purposes.”132 Justice Breyer has expanded on this “better understanding 
of congressional will” rationale for judicial deference: 
The agency that enforces the statute may have had a hand in drafting its 
provisions. It may possess an internal history in the form of documents or 
“handed-down oral tradition” that casts light on the meaning of a difficult 
phrase or provision. Regardless, its staff, in close contact with relevant 
legislators and staffs, likely understands current congressional views, which, 
in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior understandings. At a 
minimum, the agency staff understands the sorts of interpretations needed 
to “make the statute work.”133 
If agency expertise is the touchstone for Chevron deference, the fact that 
agencies play such a substantial role in the legislative process certainly bolsters 
the deference argument. Indeed, Sitaraman argues that, “at least in some 
situations, courts should grant greater deference to agencies” based on their 
involvement in the legislative process.134 That said, agency expertise is not 
the only rationale for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. 
There are, moreover, additional constitutional and normative concerns against 
such delegation of interpretive authority. Those counterarguments are addressed 
in subsection II.B.2. 
2. The Case Against Chevron Deference 
Discontent about Chevron deference has surfaced in the administrative 
law literature.135 Such discontent reached the Supreme Court in 2015 in 
 
132 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 514. 
133 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 
368 (1986). 
134 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 129. 
135 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 315-17 (2014) 
(arguing that the courts’ grant of deference to agency interpretations amounts to “abandonment of 
judicial office”); Professor Michael Herz et al., Remarks at The New Chevron Skeptics Panel at the 
Federalist Society’s 18th Annual Faculty Conference (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/
detail/the-new-chevron-skeptics-event-audiovideo [https://perma.cc/KLP3-4W9S] (exploring skepticism 
of Chevron deference). Of course, criticisms of Chevron deference are not necessarily new. Jack Beermann, 
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Michigan v. EPA.136 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the 
EPA’s “request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality 
of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”137 
Those constitutional concerns, Justice Thomas explained, involve the transfer 
of interpretive authority from courts to federal agencies—“a transfer [that] is 
in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power 
exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.”138 
In light of the findings presented in this Article, however, another opinion 
from 2015 may be of even greater importance to the future of Chevron deference. 
In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice 
Scalia’s prior call for the Court to reconsider Auer deference.139 Auer deference, 
which is also referred to as Seminole Rock deference, instructs courts that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is given “controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”140 
With John Manning leading the way, a number of scholars have called for 
the Court to eliminate this deference doctrine and “replace Seminole Rock with 
a standard that imposes an independent judicial check on the agency’s 
determination of regulatory meaning.”141 Manning’s foundational critique was 
based on separation-of-powers concerns, and he drew on legal principles set 
 
for instance, has long called for its demise because of, among other things, concerns of judicial 
administrability and manipulation. See Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing 
After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750-51 (2014) (arguing for the Chevron doctrine to 
be “jettisoned”); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 850-51 (2010) (arguing that 
Chevron is “inconsistent with the APA,” “has not accomplished its goals,” and has “spawned an 
increasingly complicated regime”). 
136 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts cut back on the breadth of Chevron 
in his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell, holding that Chevron deference does not apply to 
questions of “deep economic and political significance.” 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax 
Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 39-46 (2015) (arguing that the major questions doctrine developed 
in King v. Burwell “is a major blow to a bright-line, rule-based approach to Chevron deference”). 
137 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
138 Id. 
139 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“By my best lights, the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises 
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.”); accord id. at 
1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The opinions of Justice Scalia 
and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”). 
140 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
141 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996); see also Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court 
and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12 (1996) (asserting that 
Auer deference encourages agency rule drafters to be “vague in framing regulations, with the plan 
of issuing ‘interpretations’ to create the intended new law without observance of notice and 
comment procedures”). 
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forth long ago by Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu concerning the 
dangerous consolidation of lawmaking and law-execution powers in the same 
government actor. 
To support this proposition, Manning cites Montesquieu’s warning that 
“[w]hen legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or 
in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear 
that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them 
tyrannically.”142 Manning also relied on Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, 
pointing to Locke’s proposition that it is “too great a temptation to human 
frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons, who have the power of 
making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby 
they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make.”143 Or, as 
Blackstone put it, “where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct 
hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power 
as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the 
liberty of the subject.”144 
To address these concerns, Manning argued that courts should abandon Auer 
deference and instead apply the less-deferential Skidmore standard, which gives 
weight to an agency’s interpretation by “the thoroughness evident in the 
[agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”145 As will become clearer when alternatives 
to Chevron deference are considered later in this Article, it is worth noting 
that Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler have argued in favor of “reserv[ing] 
Seminole Rock deference for regulatory interpretations contained in formal 
orders (granting Skidmore respect to more informal interpretations).”146 
Perhaps motivated by Manning’s critique, Justice Scalia in recent years joined 
the scholarly call to revisit Auer deference, observing that “[f]or decades, and 
for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the authority to say what 
their rules mean.”147 In his concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell 
 
142 Id. (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 
1968) (1768)). 
143 Id. at 646 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 143, at 76 (C.B. 
MacPherson ed., 1980) (1690)). 
144 Id. at 648 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142). 
145 Id. at 681, 687 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
146 Matthew Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1449, 1504 (2011); see also id. at 1460 (noting that “Professor Manning persuasively argues that this 
combination of law-making and law-interpreting functions is actually a reason for serious concern, 
one that makes Seminole Rock deference problematic even if one endorses Chevron”). 
147 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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Telephone Co., Justice Scalia explained his basic concerns with Auer deference, 
distinguishing those concerns from Chevron’s foundation, 
On the surface, [Auer deference] seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an 
a fortiori application—of the rule [announced in Chevron] that we will defer 
to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing. 
But it is not. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to 
the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that 
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation). 
The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an 
agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of 
that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule’s meaning. And 
though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the 
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems 
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the 
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.148 
Justice Scalia went on to flesh out the perverse agency incentives created by 
Auer deference that he posited are not present with respect to Chevron deference. 
In particular, he argued that “[d]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to 
enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive.”149 
On the other hand, he also argued, “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of 
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, 
in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and 
predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.”150 
After Justices Alito and Thomas joined Justice Scalia in expressing 
interest in reconsidering Auer deference in the 2015 Mortgage Bankers decision, 
it seemed only a matter of time before such reconsideration would occur. 
Judge Easterbrook identified one petition pending before the Court this Term 
as a suitable vehicle for reconsideration of Auer.151 And scholars, including 
most recently Sunstein and Vermeule, have come to Auer’s defense.152 Justice 
 
148 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I do not think that it would be a prudent use of 
this court’s resources to have all nine judges consider how Auer applies to rehabilitation agreements, 
when Auer may not be long for this world. The positions taken by the three members of the panel 
show that this is one of those situations in which the precise nature of deference (if any) to an 
agency’s views may well control the outcome.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016). 
152 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716737 [https://perma.cc/32AZ-7E7B]. 
See also Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 816-17 
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Scalia’s passing potentially changed the direction of the Court with respect to 
Auer, at least for now.153 Indeed, last year the Court denied review of the 
petition Judge Easterbrook had recommended, with only Justice Thomas 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.154 That said, Justice Neil Gorsuch, 
whom the Senate recently confirmed to fill Justice Scalia’s vacancy on the 
Supreme Court, has expressed his own constitutional concerns with Chevron 
deference,155 and he may well have similar concerns about Auer deference. 
Regardless whether the Court reconsiders Auer deference, the findings in 
this Article on legislating in the shadows potentially extend the arguments 
against Auer to implicate Chevron deference as well. Let’s start with the 
oversimplified analogy between Auer and Chevron. If the agency is indeed a 
partner with Congress in legislative drafting, Justice Scalia’s concern about an 
agency legislating and executing the law should apply with some force to 
legislative drafting. The executive and legislative functions are, in essence, 
combined via legislating in the shadows. The agency often is involved in 
drafting—and may be the drafter of—the legislative ambiguities that delegate 
interpretive authority to the agency that administers the statute. 
This type of agency self-delegation—or agency self-dealing—likewise raises 
serious concerns. As Sitaraman has observed, “As is the concern with Seminole 
Rock, the agency might be creating opportunities to give itself discretion it can 
 
(2015) (“Overruling Auer would accomplish little beyond removing a useful tool that facilitates 
judicial review, increases the predictability of regulatory action, and maintains political 
accountability in agency decision-making.”). 
153 Christopher Walker, Courts Regulating the Regulators, REG. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://
www.theregreview.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-regulators [https://perma.cc/V2
Y8-VTR2]. 
154 See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608-09 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“This is the appropriate case in which to reevaluate 
Seminole Rock and Auer. But the Court chooses to sit idly by, content to let ‘[h]e who writes a law’ 
also ‘adjudge its violation.’”). Similarly, when the Court decided to grant review last October in 
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., it expressly refused to grant review on the question of whether 
to eliminate Auer deference. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369, 369 
(2016) (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
granted limited to Questions 2 and 3 presented by the petition.”), vacated and remanded 2017 WL 
855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). 
155 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time 
has come to face the behemoth.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Questions 
Gorsuch on Holding Federal Bureaucracy Accountable to the Law (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.
hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=releases&id=4A30B354-85E8-4726-A5D2-61D282AF10EB 
[https://perma.cc/8RQA-9VVG] (quoting and linking to Judge Gorsuch’s Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing testimony on Chevron deference). 
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abuse.”156 Indeed, because the agency is involved at the outset in drafting the 
legislation, Congress’s ability to regulate the bounds of agency delegation is 
hindered. Put in principal–agent terms, “If the principal (Congress) cannot 
be trusted to provide metes and bounds and to legislate against a background 
rule of delegation, an administrative law enterprise built on those foundations 
becomes suspect.”157 
Moreover, contrary to Justice Scalia’s intuition, the perverse incentives he 
identified with respect to judicial deference to agency interpretations of their 
own regulations may be similarly present in the legislative process. Chevron 
deference “to an agency’s interpretation of a statute does not encourage 
Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes.”158 But 
it could encourage agencies to draft vague statutes. Indeed, as noted in Part I, 
a number of agency officials indicated during the interviews that they often 
suggest that legislation be drafted in “broad” or “flexible” terms—in other 
words, that terms be left ambiguous—to preserve or enlarge agency discretion 
to implement the statute. To rephrase Justice Scalia’s concern, “deferring to an 
agency’s interpretation of [a statute it has helped draft] encourages the agency 
to [draft] vague [statutes] which give it the power, in future [regulatory 
efforts], to do what it pleases.” 
To be sure, this is an overly simplistic analogy. Just like the objections 
discussed in Section II.A regarding the extension of contract law’s contra 
proferentem doctrine to constrain agency statutory interpretation, there are 
obvious counterarguments to extending the Auer deference objections to 
Chevron deference. First and foremost, any separation-of-power concerns are 
much more attenuated. The agencies, after all, do not actually make the law. 
Congress retains all legislative power, and the “collective Congress”159 enacts 
the legislation in the way it deems appropriate—incorporating the agency’s 
suggested language or not. The same is true of legislative language suggested 
by lobbyists, interest groups, and other organizations involved in the 
legislative process. In other words, the Blackstone-Locke-Montesquieu 
structural concerns that Manning (and Justice Scalia) marshaled to attack 
Auer deference seem to have little force, at least as a formal constitutional 
 
156 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 126-27. Aaron Nielson makes a similar argument in the context 
of Chevron deference to statutory interpretations advanced in agency adjudications. See Aaron L. 
Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821341 
[https://perma.cc/7HS3-ZTL4]. 
157 Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 501, 503 (2015) (footnote omitted); see id. at 503-04 (arguing that if Congress cannot 
effectively patrol lawmaking delegations to federal agencies, “administrative law may require a 
fundamental rethinking”). 
158 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
159 This term is borrowed from Rao, supra note 4, at 1465 (“The Constitution creates what I term 
the ‘collective Congress’—the people’s representatives may exercise legislative power only collectively.”). 
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matter, in the context of Chevron deference and the legislative process. 
Legislating via bicameralism and presentment arguably washes away any 
constitutional impurities created by agency legislating in the shadows (and 
subsequently interpreting that legislation). 
Similar counterarguments can be made regarding the perverse incentives 
for agencies to insert ambiguities in draft legislation that they will ultimately 
interpret. Even if the various agency officials’ responses that federal agencies 
generally endeavor to draft legislation in broad, flexible, and ambiguous terms 
are representative of the regulatory state as a whole,160 it is again Congress—not 
the agency—that ultimately legislates. Indeed, this study only explores 
agencies’ perspectives on their role in the legislative process; congressional 
drafters may well view the agencies’ role and influence as more limited. Members 
of Congress, moreover, can serve as a check on delegation via ambiguity and 
may well have incentives to delegate carefully. The collective Congress ultimately 
enacts the statute. Thus, at least in theory, any enacted statutory ambiguity is 
arguably one that Congress contemplated delegating to the agency to resolve. 
The findings from this study cast some empirical doubt on these 
theoretical objections regarding incentives.161 During the agency interviews 
and the follow-up survey conducted for this study, a consistent theme concerned 
the lack of congressional awareness of the existing statutory and regulatory 
scheme and the poor quality of legislative drafting by congressional staffers. 
Oftentimes these concerns were offered in tandem with a lament about the 
turnover among congressional staffers.162 The recommendations ACUS adopted 
based on the study reflect this theme: “Although agencies, as a rule, strive to 
respond to all requests, they continue to face challenges in providing technical 
assistance. Congressional staff may be unfamiliar with an agency’s enabling 
legislation and governing statutes.”163 
In the follow-up survey, half (50%) of the agency respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed, with another two in five (40%) somewhat agreeing, that 
“[c]ongressional staffers often are unfamiliar with the agency’s governing statutes 
and implementing regulations”—tied for the highest composite score among 
 
160 Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 152 (manuscript at 14) (“For agencies, ambiguities are 
a threat at least as much as they are an opportunity. One administration might well want to ensure 
that its successor will not be allowed, with the aid of Auer, to shift from a prior position.”). 
161 For a more thorough discussion of these findings, see Walker, Federal Agencies in the 
Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
162 See id. at 33 (discussing the results of Q6(h) of the follow-up survey, in which three in ten 
(30%) agency respondents agreed and another two in five (40%) somewhat agreed, with the 
remainder (30%) disagreeing, that “[t]he turnover of staff in Congress makes it difficult for the 
agency to have a strong working relationship with Congress”). 
163 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
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the eight challenges listed in the survey.164 The agency officials reported that 
congressional staffers often propose legislation that would duplicate existing 
law or unintentionally conflict with the existing statutory (and regulatory) 
scheme. As an agency rule drafter respondent from the author’s prior survey 
put it, “Congress is producing some pretty terrible stuff to work with.”165 
Accordingly, much of the work involved in agencies providing technical 
drafting assistance consists of educating congressional staffers—and, in turn, 
the members of Congress—about what the existing law does and how the 
proposed legislation would affect that. Of course, these concerns about 
congressional staffer turnover and the poor quality of congressional drafting 
are not new and have been well-documented elsewhere.166 There is a reason 
that one of the eight recommendations ACUS adopted focuses on agency 
educational efforts of congressional staffers and their bosses.167 If the agency 
perceptions are accurate regarding the quality of congressional drafting and 
of congressional awareness of existing law, confidence in Congress reining in 
legislating in the shadows to avoid agency self-dealing seems misplaced. 
Putting aside the empirical challenges to the argument that Congress has 
the capacity to check the agency incentives implicated by legislating in the 
shadows, political scientists and economists have long theorized that individual 
members of Congress—and the congressional committees on which they 
serve—may have incentives to delegate by ambiguity distinct from an 
institutional desire to divide labor and leverage agency expertise or to otherwise 
minimize the costs of legislating.168 As Rao has explained, the political science 
 
164 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing Q6(g), 
which shows that the remainder (10%) disagreed, with no one disagreeing strongly). 
165 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1029 n.136. 
166 See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative 
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 846 (2014) (“For example, all except for two House committees 
had staff retention rates below 60% in the period between 2009 and 2011, a period in which control 
of the House passed from Democrats to Republicans.”). 
167 See Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“To improve 
the quality of proposed legislation and strengthen their relations with Congress, agencies should be 
actively engaged in educational efforts, including in-person briefings and interactions, to educate 
Congressional staff about the agencies’ respective statutory and regulatory frameworks and agency 
technical drafting expertise.”). 
168 See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 
(1999) (offering extensive literature review). As Epstein and O’Halloran observe, “Congress will 
delegate to the executive when the external transaction costs of doing so are less than the internal 
transaction costs of making policy through the normal legislative process via committees.” Id. at 43; 
see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1721, 1744 (2002) (“The ubiquity of delegation is due to the need for (a) authority and (b) division 
of labor, in any complex institution, whether public or private. All institutions must take direction 
from a person, or a small group of people, but the leader of an institution cannot possibly perform 
all of its tasks directly. Instead, the leader or principal delegates broad authority to agents.”). 
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and economics literature “emphasizes the many benefits that members of 
Congress can realize through delegation and demonstrates the strong 
incentives individual legislators have to continue delegating, even though this 
might weaken the collective lawmaking power of Congress.”169 
In addition to minimizing legislation costs, the benefits of delegating 
policymaking authority to federal agencies include shifting responsibility for 
the negative consequences of policy decisions to the agency (while still 
claiming responsibility for the positive outcomes that occur at the agency 
level); providing benefits for particular constituents in ways that may please 
donors and thus encourage campaign contributions; and avoiding specification 
where legislative compromise proves too costly.170 As Rao argues, moreover, 
many of these incentives provide “a variety of individual benefits [to members 
of Congress] outside of the legislative process” in ways that may frustrate the 
goals of the collective Congress.171 
Through ex post controls, members of Congress, and the congressional 
committees composed of members, can exercise post-delegation influence on 
agency policymaking—to the benefit of constituents, interest groups, and 
potential campaign donors in ways that may contravene the will of the collective 
Congress.172 Based on the variety of tools that members (and committees) of 
Congress have to influence agency policymaking after delegation, Rao posits 
that this “influence and control of administration by members of Congress 
allows lawmakers to also serve as law interpreters, in contravention of basic 
separation-of-powers principles.”173 This unique relationship between federal 
agencies and individual members of Congress can lead to what Rao has coined 
“administrative collusion”; “[b]y fracturing the collective Congress and 
empowering individual members, delegation also promotes collusion between 
members of Congress and administrative agencies.”174 
 
169 Rao, supra note 4, at 1477 (footnote omitted). 
170 See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 168, at 30-32 (describing a number of reasons 
Congress might have incentivizes to delegate to agencies in particular issue areas when it does not 
do so in others: spending increased time on constituent services; being able to intervene in the 
administrative process on behalf of constituents; or being able to threaten uncooperative constituents 
with harmful regulation if they do not contribute to the legislator’s reelection campaign). 
171 Rao, supra note 4, at 1481; see id. (detailing how the individual interests of members of Congress 
may be served by delegation—providing members an opportunity to intervene in the regulatory process 
on behalf of interest groups and constituents; and reducing the time and costs of legislation so members 
can spend more time engaging in activities that will improve their chances of reelection). 
172 See id. at 1482 (“Methods [of ex post controls] take a variety of official forms, including 
committee oversight, threats to reduce appropriations, investigations of administrative conduct, 
reporting requirements, and the confirmation process for high-level officials.”). 
173 Id. at 1498. 
174 Id. at 1504; see also id. at 1505-06 (“Delegations thus erode one of the primary mechanisms 
for controlling the government by undermining the structural rivalry between members of Congress 
and the executive. Instead of competing over delegation, they will often agree on open-ended 
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The unconventional principal–agent bureaucratic model that emerges—where 
the individual member or congressional committee and not the collective 
Congress is the principal—is further complicated by federal agencies’ 
provision of technical drafting assistance. As Sitaraman observes, “[i]n many 
cases, the executive [agency] may assist Congress in suggesting what topics 
are worthy of delegation, how much power to delegate, how that power might 
be used, and what resources are necessary to execute on the delegation.”175 
That the agency confers with the member of Congress in the shadows at the 
outset of the legislative process further facilitates this risk of administrative 
collusion. Not only does the federal agency have incentives to suggest 
legislative language that is broad, flexible, or otherwise ambiguous in order 
to preserve or expand the agency’s regulatory and interpretive authority, the 
individual member of Congress faces similar incentives. And both share 
incentives to collude to delegate policymaking authority to the agency 
through ambiguity. That the initial legislative-drafting discussions occur in 
secret certainly does not help to check these incentives. 
In sum, the relationship between individual members of Congress (and 
congressional committees) and federal agencies may elevate the risk that 
legislating in the shadows leads to excessive delegation of interpretive and 
policymaking authority in ways that contravene the will of the collective 
Congress. In so doing, both individual members of Congress and federal 
agencies are able to exercise lawmaking and law-interpreting authority in 
ways similar to those that concerned Scalia and Manning as to Auer deference. 
One solution, which Manning (and Stephenson and Pogoriler176) suggested 
in the context of combatting the concerns caused by Auer deference, is simply 
to switch to the less-deferential Skidmore doctrine.177 
Appreciating the difference between Chevron and Skidmore helps underscore 
how transitioning to the less-deferential Skidmore standard may help alleviate 
the concerns addressed in this Part.178 Although both Skidmore and Chevron 
are often referred to as “deference” standards, Peter Strauss has helpfully 
 
delegations of authority to agencies in order to expand the discretionary power of the legislator and 
administrators.”). 
175 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 125-26. 
176 See Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, supra note 146, at 1504 (arguing to “reserve Seminole Rock 
deference for regulatory interpretations contained in formal orders (granting Skidmore respect to 
more informal interpretations)”). 
177 See Manning, supra note 141, at 618 (contending that Skidmore constitutes an appropriate 
framework “for circumstances in which an agency is interpreting a legal text, but is not exercising 
delegated interpretive lawmaking power”). 
178 The following paragraphs draw from the author’s prior work. See Christopher J. Walker, 
How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 78-79 (2013) [hereinafter Walker, 
The Deference Lottery]. 
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reframed these standards as “Chevron space” and “Skidmore weight.”179 An 
agency receives Chevron space to fill in holes in statutes it administers because 
Congress has delegated authority for the agency to be “the authoritative 
interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes.”180 As Strauss puts 
it, under Chevron “the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports 
match, is to see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and 
that the game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts themselves 
to play the game.”181 Chevron space thus seems to reflect separation-of-powers 
values, in that “Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than 
the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”182 
Skidmore weight, by contrast, does not give agencies delegated space to be 
authoritative interpreters.183 Strauss explains that Skidmore weight “addresses the 
possibility that an agency’s view on a given statutory question may in itself 
warrant respect by judges who themselves have ultimate interpretive authority.”184 
“[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,” as the 
Skidmore Court itself explained, “[t]he weight of [a Skidmore-eligible agency 
interpretation] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”185 In such circumstances, the court—not the agency—remains the 
authoritative interpreter. 
The agency, however, retains the power to persuade based on its special 
knowledge and experience that may qualify it as an expert of statutory 
 
179 See generally Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17 (contending that Skidmore 
and Chevron “weight” are terms that more accurately describe the way that the judiciary views the 
constraints on administrative agencies). This reformulation is grounded in terms the Court has 
sometimes used to describe the standards. For instance, the Skidmore Court itself explained that 
agency interpretations subject to Skidmore, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their 
authority,” are given “weight” based on their “power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Similarly, Justice Scalia explained in his Mead dissent that ambiguities in 
statutes subject to Chevron “create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency 
discretion.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
180 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005). 
181 Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17, at 1145. 
182 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996); see also Walker, Avoiding Normative 
Canons, supra note 94, at 173-82 (exploring in more detail Chevron’s separation-of-powers foundation). 
183 Typically there is no Chevron space afforded for one of two reasons: either Congress has 
not delegated interpretive authority to the agency; or Congress has delegated such space, but the 
agency has “cho[sen] not to exercise that authority, but rather to guide—to indicate desired 
directions without undertaking (as [it] might) to compel them.” Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, 
supra note 17, at 1145. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 1154 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). 
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meaning and purpose. As the author has noted in prior work that now takes 
on additional significance in light of the empirical findings in this study, “the 
agency may have been present during the legislative drafting (and may actually 
have assisted in drafting), and the agency likely has extensive, nationwide 
experience in implementing the statute.”186 Indeed, if the persuasiveness turns 
on the agency’s involvement in the legislative process—be it either substantive 
or technical legislative assistance—the agency would be encouraged to reveal 
its involvement. In other words, the agency can choose to “buy” Skidmore 
weight by providing details of its legislative involvement.187 As discussed in 
Section III.A, this increased transparency may well have independent value 
for administrative governance. 
Strauss further elaborates additional reasons why agencies have power to 
persuade distinct from regular litigants: 
It is not only that agencies have the credibility of their circumstances, but 
also that they can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally 
uniform understanding of the law that would be disrupted by the variable 
results to be expected from a geographically and politically diverse judiciary 
encountering the hardest . . . issues with little experience with the overall 
scheme and its patterns.188 
Put differently, the weight of an agency’s interpretation should be heavier 
than the ordinary litigant’s power to persuade. Indeed, Skidmore weight can 
take into account one of the common rationales for Chevron deference—the 
need for uniformity in federal administrative law. 
The concerns raised by legislating in the shadows—and the recommendation 
to replace Chevron space with Skidmore weight—take on added significance in 
light of the empirical realities of agency rulemaking, as revealed in the 
author’s prior study on agency rule drafters. Among more than twenty 
interpretive tools included in the survey, Chevron deference was reported by 
most (90%) agency rule drafters as being used when interpreting statutes and 
drafting regulations.189 
The vast majority of agency rule drafters surveyed think about judicial 
review when drafting statutes and understand Chevron and Skidmore and how 
their chances in court are better under Chevron. “Indeed, two in five rule 
drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed—and another two in five 
somewhat agreed—that a federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive 
 
186 Walker, The Deference Lottery, supra note 178, at 79. 
187 Thanks to Zach Clopton for this excellent observation. 
188 Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17, at 1146. 
189 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1020 fig.2. 
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efforts if it is confident that Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore 
deference or de novo review) applies.”190 
By comparison, whereas nine in ten (90%) agency rule drafters surveyed 
indicated that they use Chevron deference when interpreting statutes and 
drafting regulations, only about two in five (39%) indicated that they use Auer 
deference.191 In other words, any concerns about perverse incentives for 
agency regulators caused by Auer deference may be much less pervasive than 
concerns as to the incentives caused by Chevron deference.192 
Accordingly, agencies have incentives to draft statutes flexibly, broadly, and 
ambiguously to trigger Chevron deference—and thus engage in self-delegation 
of primary interpretive authority. These agencies have further incentives to 
be more aggressive in their agency statutory interpretations when they 
believe Chevron deference applies. This creates incentives that the Chevron 
Court and the current Court have likely never considered. Legislating in the 
shadows must be understood and considered when discussing to what degree 
courts should defer to agency statutory interpretations. It might make sense 
to abandon Chevron space altogether and turn to Skidmore weight, which 
focuses more on the agency’s expertise in the subject matter and in the 
legislative process leading up to the statute’s enactment. In some ways, as 
further discussed in Section III.C, judicial review under Skidmore would look 
a lot like judicial review of agency statutory interpretation conducted under 
the more purposivist approach articulated in Section II.A. 
3.  The Case for a More Limited Chevron Deference 
Despite the suggestion in subsection II.B.2 to abandon Chevron deference 
and replace it with the less-deferential Skidmore standard, the Supreme Court 
is unlikely to abandon Chevron deference in its entirety any time soon. 
 
190 Id. at 163; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical 
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721-28 (2014) (exploring these findings in greater detail). 
191 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1061 fig.11; see also Sunstein & 
Vermeule, supra note 152 (manuscript at 13) (discussing these findings in defending Auer deference). 
192 Chevron deference was also the interpretive tool identified as being used by the most 
congressional drafters in the Bressman and Gluck study. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 
18, at 993 fig.10. One could argue whether congressional drafters are well aware that Chevron 
deference—in particular, that if they leave ambiguities in statutes, agencies become the authoritative 
interpreters—means that Congress should be careful about leaving ambiguities in statutory 
language. The idea of careful drafting to avoid delegation is in tension with the political science and 
economic literature discussed above. On the other hand, this widespread awareness of Chevron 
deference also suggests that congressional drafters understand how to better collude with their 
agency counterparts while legislating in the shadows. 
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Congress, of course, could also act.193 Indeed, the Separation of Powers 
Restoration Act, which passed the House in 2017, would amend the judicial 
review section of the Administrative Procedure Act to instruct courts to 
“decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies.”194 In 
other words, the proposed legislation would purport to get rid of both 
Chevron and Auer deference.195 As of May 2017, unsurprisingly, only one 
Democrat joined the Republicans in sponsoring the bill in the House,196 and 
only five House Democrats voted in favor of it.197 It is unlikely to be enacted, 
though it will be interesting to see what the Senate and new presidential 
administration decide to do. 
There are strong arguments, moreover, that wholesale abandonment of 
Chevron deference to address legislating in the shadows is similar to using a 
hammer when a screwdriver would be more appropriate. This is particularly 
true in light of our inability to empirically assess the extent to which Congress 
incorporates agency technical drafting assistance and the extent to which such 
assistance creates statutory ambiguity in an agency self-dealing fashion. 
Perhaps the concerns about legislating in the shadows can be addressed more 
narrowly and effectively. For instance, Shobe, when considering the role of 
federal agencies in both substantive and technical legislative drafting, argues 
that courts should “be more willing to move away from Chevron deference, 
absent other indicators, in situations where the body of Congress responsible 
for the legislation was from a political party different than the party of the 
President that Congress expects to be implementing the legislation.”198 Shobe 
bases this conclusion in part on the literature that posits that Congress is 
 
193 Indeed, as Kent Barnett has documented, Congress has on at least one occasion—in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 regarding preemption 
decisions by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—codified Skidmore deference in lieu of 
Chevron deference. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015); see also 
Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise within Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 587, 605 (2014) (noting that Congress could codify Chevron deference when agencies follow 
certain procedures or certain contingencies occur). 
194 H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (as passed by House, Jan. 11, 2017); see also S. 2724, 114th 
Cong. § 2 (2016) (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 17, 2016) (proposing the same standard of review 
with similar statutory language). 
195 For more on the legislation, see Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron 
Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1098-1105 (2016) [hereinafter Walker, Context-Specific Chevron Deference]. 
196 See Cosponsors: H.R.5—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/SQ38-XBU5] (listing 
the twenty-four House Republican cosponsors and single Democratic cosponsor of a bill containing 
the Separation of Powers Restoration Act). 
197 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 45, CONGRESS.GOV, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/
roll045.xml [https://perma.cc/QVT2-2B5J] (listing the 223 House Republicans that voted for the bill 
containing the Separation of Powers Restoration Act alongside only five House Democratic members). 
198 Shobe, supra note 13, at 510. 
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more likely to delegate interpretive authority to an ally (unified government) 
than a foe (divided government).199 In circumstances of divided government, 
Shobe also suggests that the reviewing court should apply Skidmore weight 
instead of Chevron space.200 
Although perhaps worth considering for other reasons, Shobe’s specific 
proposal seems unlikely to address the perverse incentives created by 
legislating in the shadows discussed in Section II.B that may result from 
administrative collusion between a member of Congress and the agency 
providing the legislative-drafting assistance. That administrative collusion 
would likely take place in unified and divided government. But Shobe’s 
proposal to change Chevron deference from a broad, bright-line rule to a 
context-specific one may help address these concerns. 
Instead of applying Chevron deference to statutory ambiguity whenever 
Congress has delegated general rulemaking or formal adjudicatory authority 
to the agency (and the agency has utilized that procedure to adopt the 
statutory interpretation), the reviewing court could assess whether the 
collective Congress reasonably intended to delegate by ambiguity that 
particular issue to the agency. The court would inquire whether the ambiguity 
seems like a deliberate delegation by the collective Congress, or whether it 
seems more like the result of administrative collusion during the legislative 
process—or even just legislative inadvertence—that the collective Congress 
would not have intended to result in a delegation of interpretive authority to 
the agency. In other words, the Chevron Step Zero inquiry would focus not 
just on the formality of the agency procedure creating the interpretation but 
also on whether the collective Congress intended to delegate that particular 
substantive question to the agency.201 Such an approach would also encourage 
 
199 Id. at 509-12 & nn.256-64. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 168, at 122-62 (confirming 
the hypothesis that as the preferences of Congress and the President diverge, Congress will delegate 
less discretionary authority to agencies); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2016) (asserting that the “competition” between the 
legislative and executive branch “var[ies] significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether 
the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party”); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (2011) (discussing that “a 
principal is willing to delegate more discretion to an agent with expected policy preferences similar to 
the principal’s own—a hypothesis sometimes referred to as the ‘ally principal’”). 
200 Shobe, supra note 13, at 511 n.265. 
201 For more on Chevron Step Zero, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873-88 (2001), which delineates three operating principles that courts 
should follow in resolving questions about Chevron’s domain. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron 
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207-11 (2006) (discussing the applicability of the Chevron framework 
and potential approaches to a Chevron Step Zero analysis). See generally Peter M. Shane & 
Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 475, 477-84 (2014) (reviewing recent literature and case law on the scope of Chevron 
deference under Step Zero). 
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the collective Congress to be more explicit when intending to delegate 
interpretive authority to a federal agency. 
If this case-by-case approach to Chevron deference sounds familiar, it may 
be because Chief Justice Roberts suggested something quite similar in his 
dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC202 and his opinion for the Court in King v. 
Burwell.203 In 2013, the Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC, which held 
that Chevron deference applies to statutory ambiguity concerning the scope of 
an agency’s regulatory authority (or jurisdiction).204 In reaching this conclusion, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, framed the inquiry of whether Chevron 
deference applies to statutory ambiguity in broad and bright-line terms: “the 
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has 
unambiguously vested the [agency] with general authority to administer the 
[statute] through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation 
at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”205 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, dissented. 
The dissent bemoaned the sprawl of the modern administrative state and how 
“[t]he Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal 
bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our 
economic, social, and political activities.”206 To combat this administrative 
power, the Chief Justice argued that Chevron deference should not apply to 
every statutory ambiguity whenever Congress has granted the agency general 
rulemaking or adjudicatory power.207 Instead, quoting the Chevron decision 
itself, the Chief Justice argued that the reviewing court should evaluate 
“whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute.’”208 The Chief Justice then documented how 
the Court has “never faltered in [its] understanding of this straightforward 
principle, that whether a particular agency interpretation warrants Chevron 
deference turns on the court’s determination whether Congress has delegated 
to the agency the authority to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue.”209 
 
202 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1881 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that courts analyze whether Congress delegated authority to the agency to elucidate a 
“specific provision” of the statute to determine whether Chevron deference applies). 
203 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-99 (2015) (asserting that the application of 
Chevron deference is premised on the theory that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps). This discussion of the Chief Justice’s approach to Chevron 
deference draws substantially from, and is further explored in, the author’s prior work. See Walker, 
Context-Specific Chevron Deference, supra note 195, at 1098-1105. 
204 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75. 
205 Id. at 1874. 
206 Id. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
207 Id. at 1879-80. 
208 Id. at 1881 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-84 (1984)). 
209 Id.; see also id. at 1881-83 (reviewing precedent on point). 
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In response, Justice Scalia sharpened the distinction between these two 
approaches to Chevron deference. Justice Scalia called the dissent’s approach 
“a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence” because, under the dissent’s 
“open-ended hunt for congressional intent,” “even when general rulemaking 
authority is clear, every agency rule [would] be subjected to a de novo judicial 
determination of whether the particular issue was committed to agency 
discretion.”210 For Justice Scalia, the dissent’s context-specific approach would 
result in “some sort of totality-of-the-circumstances test—which is really, of 
course, not a test at all but an invitation to make an ad hoc judgment regarding 
congressional intent.”211 Accordingly, he argued, “The excessive agency power 
that the dissent fears would be replaced by chaos.”212 
Not surprisingly, Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, agreed with 
the dissent’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference.213 He provided 
additional guidance on how to determine if Congress had intended to 
delegate interpretive authority to the agency by ambiguity.214 Drawing on his 
opinion for the Court in Barnhart v. Walton, Justice Breyer noted that the 
Court has previously “assessed ‘the interstitial nature of the legal question, 
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of 
time.’”215 Justice Breyer also noted the relevance of the statutory provision’s 
subject matter—“its distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties or 
its falling within the scope of another agency’s authority.”216 
In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, continued 
to develop his context-specific approach in City of Arlington.217 Although the 
Court ultimately sided with the federal government in interpreting the 
Affordable Care Act’s tax credit provisions, it refused to accord any deference 
to the regulation interpreting the statute. Like he did in his City of Arlington 
dissent, the Chief Justice noted that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may 
 
210 Id. at 1874 (majority opinion). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  
214 Id. 
215 Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)). 
216 Id. at 1875-76 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265-66 (2006); Ernest Gellhorn & 
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1007-10 (1999)). 
217 See, e.g., Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 41 (observing that “the Chief ’s case-by-case 
approach [in King v. Burwell] of looking to the particular statutory subsection for congressional intent 
of delegation (at least for major questions) reads a lot like his dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC”). 
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be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an 
implicit delegation.”218 The Chief Justice went on to explain, 
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, 
involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of 
health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available 
on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political 
significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to 
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.219 
The Chief Justice further observed that “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress 
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in 
crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”220 
Similar to the Chief Justice’s dissent in City of Arlington, this new major 
questions doctrine departs from the bright-line, rule-based approach to Chevron 
deference that Justice Scalia rearticulated for the Court in City of Arlington. 
To be sure, the major questions doctrine is not new. Even Justice Scalia has 
invoked it, colorfully explaining that the doctrine is the presumption that 
Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague 
terms of ancillary positions—it does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”221 
Its application here, however, seems less obvious and indicative of a more 
general context-specific inquiry into congressional intent.222 
To the extent the Chief Justice is looking for more support for a context-specific 
approach to Chevron deference, the findings from this study may well provide 
it. Strengthening Chevron Step Zero to inquire whether the collective Congress 
“had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
 
218 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
219 Id. at 2489. At oral argument Justice Kennedy suggested adopting such an approach while 
discussing Chevron deference: “it seems to me a drastic step for us to say that the Department of 
Internal Revenue and its director can make this call one way or the other when there are, what, 
billions of dollars of subsidies involved here?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
220 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
221 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  
222 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major Questions 
Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2017) (exploring further the origins of the new major 
questions doctrine in King v. Burwell and how that doctrine differs from prior precedent). Despite 
the novelty of Chief Justice’s approach to major questions in King v. Burwell, it does find some 
support from the agency rule drafters surveyed in the author’s prior study. See Walker, Inside Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1053-58 & fig.10 (reporting that approximately half (56%) of 
the agency rule drafters surveyed—compared to about a quarter (28%) of congressional respondents 
in the Bressman and Gluck study—believed that Congress intends to delegate ambiguities relating 
to major policy questions). For a further explanation of these findings, see Walker, Context-Specific 
Chevron Deference, supra note 195, at 1105-14. 
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statute’”223 would help prevent administrative collusion between members of 
Congress and the federal agencies that together legislate in the shadows. This 
more limited Chevron doctrine would also likely encourage the collective 
Congress to more expressly indicate its intent to delegate by ambiguity. 
Moreover, unlike abandoning Chevron deference entirely, as suggested 
in subsection II.B.2, it is more realistic that the Court will adopt a more 
context-specific approach to Chevron. Based on the opinions in City of Arlington, 
Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy are already on board for the Chief Justice’s 
context-specific approach. Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor also 
joined the Chief Justice’s opinion in King v. Burwell—though one would be 
wise not to read too much into their decision to join the Chief Justice’s opinion.224 
Additionally, Justice Thomas is now concerned that Chevron deference is 
unconstitutional and thus may be inclined to adopt a move to limit Chevron’s 
domain.225 The same is true of the newest addition to the Court—Justice 
Gorsuch—who expressed constitutional concerns with Chevron deference 
while serving on the Tenth Circuit.226 
III. TRANSPARENCY, DEFERENCE, AND TRADEOFFS 
As opposed to reworking judicial review of agency statutory interpretation, 
the simpler solution may be to require that agency technical drafting 
assistance take place in the sunshine instead of the shadows. Or perhaps to 
increase political accountability it should at least be more closely monitored 
 
223 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1881 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-84 (1984)). 
224 First, it is unclear whether the Court or lower courts will extend King v. Burwell’s “sweeping 
change in administrative law to other regulatory contexts” or whether “this new major questions 
doctrine may well be good for tax only.” See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 46. Second, the 
Court’s four more liberal members may have joined the Chief Justice’s opinion to uphold the 
Affordable Care Act but not necessarily agreed with the Chief Justice’s reasoning on Chevron 
deference. See Adam Liptak, Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/supreme-court-tacks-left-with-push-from-
disciplined-liberals.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PFC9-SMTU]. Their “discipline” in voting together 
to achieve desired outcomes may mask disagreements on reasoning and interpretation. Id. 
225 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the agency’s “request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality of our broader 
practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes”). Justice Thomas may be unwilling 
to join the Chief Justice’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference. However, since Thomas 
likely believes Chevron is unconstitutional, he might concur in judgment to a Roberts plurality opinion 
that significantly altered Chevron. Thomas’s fifth vote would make the Roberts plurality opinion the 
narrowest and thus the precedential opinion. 
226 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time 
has come to face the behemoth.”). 
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by the President through OMB preclearance and coordination—similar to 
the agency’s substantive legislative activities. After all, core principles of the 
modern administrative state include transparency, accountability, and open 
governance. Sections III.A and III.B briefly consider and reject these 
arguments. Section III.C then introduces the “double deference” problem 
that emerges if one accepts a more purposivist approach to agency statutory 
interpretation that does not eliminate, or at least narrow, Chevron deference. 
A. Against Transparency 
As outlined in Section I.B, the current norm is that the congressional 
requester expects the technical drafting assistance request and the agency 
response to remain confidential. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, based on a 
somewhat odd set of facts, has held that certain agency technical drafting 
assistance is not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
because it is a congressional, as opposed to agency, record.227 As detailed in 
Section II.B, moreover, this secrecy exacerbates the risk of administrative 
collusion in the legislative process. 
It is thus no surprise that a common response to the findings presented in 
this Article is to suggest that technical drafting assistance should be public and 
on the record. C. Boyden Gray’s reaction is representative:  
There should be more disclosure of what Congress does as to agency 
interpretation. . . . [A]ll contacts by Congress with OMB and with the agencies 
be logged . . . . Obviously there are incentives . . . for Congressmen and 
Senators to leave things vague so that they can go back in and trade a fix for 
it for a little campaign donation here, a little help here, a little PAC here.228 
This open-governance suggestion finds some support in the administrative 
law literature. After all, transparency has long been recognized as a core value to 
promote accountability in the regulatory state. For instance, Peter Shane has 
 
227 See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In this circuit, 
whether the IRS response is subject to FOIA turns on whether Congress manifested a clear intent 
to control the document. Applying that standard to the circumstances of this case and balancing 
Congress’s authority to maintain the confidentiality of its own materials against the broad mandate 
of disclosure lying at the heart of FOIA, we conclude that only those portions of the IRS response 
that would reveal the congressional request are not subject to FOIA.”). But see id. at 605 (Henderson, 
J., dissenting) (“I believe the district court correctly analyzed the four factors set forth in Tax Analysts 
to conclude that the IRS does not have sufficient ‘control’ of its copy of its response to the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT)’s request to make the document disclosable as an ‘agency record’ 
under FOIA.” (footnote omitted)). 
228 See C. Boyden Gray, Remarks at the Separation of Powers: Congress, Agencies, and the 
Court Panel at George Mason University Center for the Study of the Administrative State’s 2016 
Public Policy Conference on Rethinking Judicial Deference, at 45:00 (June 2, 2016), https://vimeo.
com/169757569 [https://perma.cc/74AD-WBZK] (responding to an earlier draft of this Article). 
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noted that “the openness of agency decision making to public scrutiny—the relative 
transparency in terms of process—is itself a guarantee of public accountability.”229 
Indeed, Adrian Vermeule has aptly observed that “transparency deters officials 
from engaging in self-interest[ed] bargaining,”230 such as, perhaps, the type 
of self-dealing concerns implicated by legislating in the shadows. 
Although public disclosure may be the simplest solution to the problems 
of legislating in the shadows, the costs of such an on-the-record requirement are 
too great. As Frederick Schauer has explained, “Transparency is not, of course, 
an unalloyed good, much of contemporary popular rhetoric notwithstanding.”231 
Indeed, he notes, “Secrecy, privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality also have 
their virtues, and we can all understand why transparency is a far more 
desirable attribute for sunroom windows than it is for bathroom doors.”232 
Here, confidentiality likely encourages congressional drafters to leverage 
agency expertise to draft better, more technically correct legislation. A public 
disclosure requirement, in contrast, would likely discourage Congress from 
even consulting with agencies at an early stage in the legislative process—when 
the legislation is more easily reworked and thus where input from agency 
subject-matter experts is most valuable. Such a disclosure requirement would 
be even more problematic if other outside drafters, such as lobbyists and 
 
229 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 160 (2009); accord ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 6 (2007) (noting that “[t]ransparency is necessary, at least 
to some degree, to any conception of accountability”); Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former 
Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 364-65 (2014) (explaining why the lack of transparency poses problems for 
administrative governance); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision 
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1161 (2010) (arguing that “[i]ncreasing transparency regarding 
presidential influence on a particular agency decision . . . could facilitate a public dialogue where 
citizens are persuaded that the decision made . . . is still the correct decision for the country,” whereas 
“submerging presidential preferences undermines electoral accountability for agency decisions and 
reduces the chances of a public dialogue on policy”); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source 
of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2259 (2016) (noting in a different regulatory context that 
“there are costs to the current system of opacity with respect to accountability”). 
230 VERMEULE, supra note 229, at 181. 
231 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1342. 
232 Id.; see id. at 1346-51 (discussing aims, costs, benefits, and tradeoffs of transparency); see also 
Mendelson, supra note 229, at 1166-68 (detailing the potential concerns associated with greater public 
disclosure). Indeed, there is a large literature outside of law that focuses on the costs of transparency 
in governance. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 389 
(2010) (“Transparency is a highly regarded value, a precept used for ideological purposes, and a 
subject of academic study. . . . [Nonetheless, t]ransparency is overvalued. Moreover, its ideological 
usages cannot be justified, because a social science analysis shows that transparency cannot fulfill the 
functions its advocates assign to it, although it can play a limited role in their service.”); Justin Fox, 
Government Transparency and Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23, 24 (2007) (determining the “specific 
conditions under which making the policy process more open can have a deleterious effect on the 
public’s welfare”); Justin Fox & Richard Van Weelden, Costly Transparency, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 142, 142 
(2012) (identifying “conditions under which [transparency] can decrease the principal’s welfare”). 
1428 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1377 
interest groups, could continue to provide confidential feedback. The tradeoff 
of less transparency for an increased likelihood that technical drafting assistance 
actually takes place is likely an efficient one. Indeed, ACUS appeared to 
conclude as much when it recommended that that “[c]ongressional committees 
and individual Members should aim to reach out to agencies for technical 
assistance early in the legislative drafting process.”233 
This cost–benefit analysis in favor of confidentiality becomes even more 
compelling when one considers reasonable alternatives that produce somewhat 
similar benefits and impose substantially fewer costs. Namely, as discussed in 
Section II.B, we could rethink how courts review agency statutory interpretations. 
The elimination of Chevron deference—or at least its narrowing—would not 
discourage agencies from being substantially involved in the legislative process. 
But it would mitigate the perverse incentives agencies may have to legislate 
in the shadows in a self-dealing fashion. Moreover, such a solution would 
encourage members of Congress and federal agencies to maintain a rich 
dialogue and effective principal–agent relationship, which should lead to 
better legislative and regulatory outputs. 
B. Against Presidential Preclearance 
If one remains concerned about accountability yet agrees that public 
disclosure would prove too costly, another option would be to increase White 
House review. Currently, OMB does not require preclearance of agency 
technical drafting assistance, only post-assistance notice.234 The findings of 
this study, moreover, suggest that OMB is seldom kept in the loop even 
though Circular A-19 requires such notice.235 Increased OMB review would 
perhaps help remedy accountability problems without requiring full public 
transparency. Indeed, some may well argue that the President has a 
constitutional duty to supervise agency legislating in the shadows, perhaps to 
avoid the Blackstone-Locke-Montesquieu structural separation-of-powers 
concerns implicated by administrative collusion in the legislative process.236 
 
233 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
234 OMB Circular A-19, supra note 23, § 7(i). 
235 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 10 (finding “that the 
majority of agencies do not comply with these [post-assistance notice] instructions with respect to 
the run-of-the-mill technical drafting assistance requests” and that, “based on information gathered 
from the federal agencies, it does not appear that OMB has made any systematic effort to enforce 
these notice and transmittal requirements”). 
236 Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842 (2015) 
(arguing that “the Constitution embodies a duty to supervise that current doctrine has simply failed 
to acknowledge” and that “[a] version of the duty based on Article II demands [presidential] 
supervision by and within the executive branch”). To be sure, Professor Metzger has not argued that 
the President should supervise agency technical drafting assistance. Moreover, from her comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article, she does not seem to perceive a constitutional problem with agency 
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Conversely, there is an extensive literature setting forth the normative 
problems with current White House review of agency rulemaking and other 
regulatory activities.237 Two of those problems, as Lisa Heinzerling has explored 
in greater detail, are particularly important here: the lack of transparency in the 
OMB review process and the lack of accountability for OMB decisionmaking.238 
Moreover, Judge Posner’s criticism of another proposal for OMB to be more 
involved in coordinating interagency adjudication activities seems applicable 
here as well: “what would paralyze federal regulation would be for White House 
staff to attempt to regulate the relations among the agencies. It would be a 
bureaucratic disaster.”239 “The result would be to slow down enforcement and 
foment bickering,” he continued, adding that “[b]ureaucrats would be locking 
horns” and “[h]igher officials in the immense White House staff would be 
called in to arbitrate the disputes” in a way that “would make things worse.”240 
In the interviews and surveying conducted for this study, agency officials 
raised similar criticisms of OMB’s current practices to review agency 
legislative activities yet also seemed to universally reject the proposal for 
OMB preclearance or other review of technical drafting assistance.241 
 
legislating in the shadows—at least not based on an analogy to the Scalia–Manning Auer deference 
concerns outlined in subsection II.B.2. Perhaps most importantly, as further discussed below, the 
lack of White House preclearance of technical drafting assistance does not mean the President 
provides no supervision. Political appointees in the agency’s legislative affairs office serve as 
gatekeepers and liaisons with Congress to control agency interactions with Congress. 
237 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative 
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006) (casting 
doubt on the assertion that White House involvement promotes regulatory effectiveness, at least as 
it relates to the EPA); Heinzerling, supra note 229 (describing the OIRA process as it operates in 
relation to the EPA); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987) (arguing for more stringent limitations on ex parte attempts by the 
President and his staff to influence rulemaking); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency 
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (suggesting that the 
system of OMB control “imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased health and 
safety of the American public”); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative 
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001) (exploring policy considerations that 
counsel against giving the President authority to dictate decisions entrusted to executive officers by 
statute); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. 
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012) (arguing that “centralized White House regulatory review is a 
primary cause of regulatory failure that the nation can well do without”). 
238 See Heinzerling, supra note 229, at 364-65 (criticizing the opacity of the OIRA process). 
239 See POSNER, supra note 18, at 46 (discussing Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency 
Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015)). 
240 Id. 
241 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 33 (“These comments 
ranged from complaints about how slow and burdensome the OMB preclearance is, and how 
antiquated the current guidelines are (they have not been updated in over three decades), to how 
there is no clear standard to distinguish between technical and substantive legislative assistance, and 
how the notice and transmittal requirements for technical assistance are honored in the breach and/or 
should be formally abandoned. Many agency officials, however, also countered that Circular A-19 
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Similar to the costs of public disclosure, presidential review could also 
discourage congressional staffers from seeking technical drafting assistance—out 
of fear that the President would intervene to disrupt a legislative initiative 
before it had even begun. (This is not to mention that congressional staffers 
expect quick turnarounds on technical drafting assistance requests, and OMB 
review would no doubt frustrate that expectation.) Moreover, the benefits of 
a formalized OMB process seem to be overstated. After all, the lack of White 
House preclearance of technical drafting assistance does not mean the President 
does no supervision—at least with respect to executive branch agencies. The 
President’s political appointees in the agency’s legislative affairs office serve 
as gatekeepers and liaisons with Congress to ensure more political oversight 
of agency interactions with Congress. 
In sum, the substantial costs of presidential review of legislating in the 
shadows would likely outweigh any benefits. And those benefits would likely 
not include reducing the incentives for agency self-dealing. To the contrary, 
one could imagine the White House utilizing technical drafting assistance to 
further shift power to the executive branch in ways that may not be possible 
through the political process. 
C. Against Double Deference 
This Part considers alternatives to rethinking judicial deference doctrines 
in light of the phenomenon of legislating in the shadows. It is worth noting 
one further complication that likely merits a more extended treatment: the 
problem of “double deference.” As discussed in Section II.A, there has been 
a growing call among administrative law scholars to allow federal agencies to 
engage in more purposivist statutory interpretation, as compared to their judicial 
counterparts, given agencies’ comparative expertise in legislative history and 
the legislative process that resulted in the statute being enacted.242 The findings 
presented in this Article provide some empirical support for that scholarly call. 
Embracing a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation 
without revisiting Chevron deference, however, could result in a double deference 
phenomenon that has not been previously appreciated. In other words, the 
reviewing court would allow an agency to have more purposivist leeway (or 
deference) in interpreting statutory text based on the agency’s superior 
understanding of congressional purpose or intent. The added deference could 
inform the Chevron Step One inquiry regarding statutory ambiguity. The 
 
should not be revisited as the informal agency (and OMB) processes that have developed to function 
around the formal Circular A-19 processes work efficiently; formal modification by OMB would 
likely only disrupt an informal system that seems to be functioning quite well.”). 
242 See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text (discussing and citing relevant literature). 
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reviewing court would then also defer to any reasonable agency interpretation 
of the statute at Chevron Step Two. Such a double deference standard would 
depart from the Court’s current Chevron doctrine approach, and in the process 
would provide even more incentives for agencies to self-deal while legislating 
in the shadows.243 
To properly recalibrate agency statutory interpretation in light of agency 
legislating in the shadows, it might make the most sense to allow agencies to 
engage in more purposivist statutory interpretation, yet to review such 
interpretations for Skidmore weight instead of Chevron space. Indeed, there 
are striking similarities between purposivism and Skidmore: Both encourage the 
agency to produce and analyze evidence of statutory purpose or intent—evidence 
about which agencies may have comparative expertise over courts.244 Both 
place greater weight on whether a particular interpretation furthers the objectives 
of the statute, focusing more on the intended effect or substance of the statute 
than just its plain text or form.245 
Adopting the Chief Justice’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference, 
by contrast, would not eliminate the risk of double deference (assuming the 
Court also allows for a more purposivist approach). But this narrowing of 
Chevron to examine whether the collective Congress intended to delegate 
interpretive authority to the agency as to the particular provision would 
arguably reduce much of the costs associated with legislating in the shadows. 
Federal agencies would continue to provide confidential technical drafting 
assistance to encourage congressional drafters to leverage agency expertise, 
but agencies would have fewer incentives for self-dealing in the absence of a 
more bright-line Chevron deference doctrine. 
 
 
243 This double deference point is reminiscent of Justice Stevens’s “double reasonableness” 
observation regarding qualified immunity in the Fourth Amendment context. See Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s decision to 
“approve a double standard of reasonableness—the constitutional standard already embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment and an even more generous standard that protects any officer who reasonably could 
have believed that his conduct was constitutionally reasonable”); accord Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
214 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“Double counting ‘objective reasonableness,’ the 
Court appears to suggest, is demanded by Anderson, which twice restated that qualified immunity 
shields the conduct of officialdom ‘across the board.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
244 Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a 
fair understanding of the legislative plan.”). 
245 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 35-39 (arguing that the Chief Justice’s contextualist 
approach to interpretation in King v. Burwell and NFIB v. Sebelius favors the statute’s substance over 
its textual form). 
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CONCLUSION 
As documented in this Article, federal agencies play a substantial role in 
the legislative process—both in the foreground by drafting the substantive 
legislation the Administration desires to submit to Congress and in the 
shadows by providing confidential technical drafting assistance on legislation 
that originates from congressional staffers. The latter type of statutory drafting 
is of vital importance to the legislative process, as it leverages the agency’s 
expertise and vast regulatory experience in the subject matter to improve the 
legislative output. Accordingly, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States has wisely recommended that “[c]ongressional committees and individual 
Members should aim to reach out to agencies for technical assistance early in 
the legislative drafting process” and that “[f]ederal agencies should endeavor 
to provide Congress with technical drafting assistance when asked.”246 
Legislating in the shadows, however, is not without costs. It can provide 
incentives for a federal agency and member(s) of Congress to collude to 
expand the agency’s regulatory authority by leaving ambiguities in proposed 
legislation to be later interpreted by the agency—in ways that may be 
contrary to the wishes of the collective Congress. Such administrative 
collusion allows the federal agency to impermissibly be both the law-maker 
and the law-interpreter. Indeed, one recurring theme from the agency 
interviews conducted for this study is that federal agency officials often 
provide technical drafting assistance that keeps the proposed statutory 
language broad and flexible in order to preserve (or perhaps expand) the 
scope of the agency’s regulatory authority. 
It is safe to assume that the Chevron Court did not consider this phenomenon 
when it crystalized the doctrine that a court should defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency administers. 
Nor did Justice Scalia when he reiterated a broad, bright-line Chevron approach 
in City of Arlington, much less when he expressed concerns with Auer deference 
yet dismissed similar concerns with Chevron deference. Appreciating the 
expansive role of federal agencies in the legislative process should encourage 
rethinking of how courts review agency statutory interpretations. 
For some on the federal bench, in Congress, and in the legal academy, that 
may well mean abandoning Chevron deference in favor of the less-deferential 
Skidmore standard. For others, it may encourage a more limited, context-specific 
Chevron doctrine, similar to the approach the Chief Justice embraced in his 
dissent in City of Arlington and his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell. 
Yet for others, this phenomenon may well just reinforce their current view that 
courts should grant great deference (indeed, perhaps double deference) to 
 
246 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
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agency statutory interpretations because of the agency’s deep understanding 
of its statutory mandate and vast experience and expertise in the subject 
matter. In all events, this Article only begins the conversation about the role 
of federal agencies in the legislative process. Much more empirical and 
theoretical work needs to be done. 
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